摘要
Stanley and Williamson claim that knowing-how is simply a species of propositional knowledge,and therefore Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that is an illusion.This claim results from their analysis of knowledge-how ascriptions and the standard linguistic theories about embedded questions.However,in order to deal with knowing-how in the ability sense,they have to introduce the notion of practical modes of presentation into their theoretical framework.In this article,I argue that in such a framework,the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that,rather than being dismissed,just takes a new face,namely the distinction between practical modes of presentation and the ordinary mode of presentation.
Stanley and Williamson claim that knowing-how is simply a species of propositional knowledge,and therefore Ryle's distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that is an illusion.This claim results from their analysis of knowledge-how ascriptions and the standard linguistic theories about embedded questions.However,in order to deal with knowing-how in the ability sense,they have to introduce the notion of practical modes of presentation into their theoretical framework.In this article,I argue that in such a framework,the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that,rather than being dismissed,just takes a new face,namely the distinction between practical modes of presentation and the ordinary mode of presentation.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期68-76,129,共9页
Philosophical Research
