摘要
本文以1999到2007年沪深A股非管制类上市公司为样本,从相对薪酬差距角度研究薪酬业绩敏感性,通过将企业内部薪酬差距分为高管团队内部薪酬差距和高管与普通员工薪酬差距,对薪酬差距与企业业绩的敏感性进行分析。研究发现:我国上市公司的薪酬差距安排与业绩显著正相关,支持锦标赛理论;民营企业薪酬差距安排有更强的激励效果;高管对董事会的控制强度可能影响薪酬差距;管理层持股和管理层更换作为薪酬安排的替代机制,与薪酬差距负相关;企业规模对不同类型的薪酬差距有显著影响;2004年以来的国企薪酬管制减弱了薪酬差距与业绩的关系。
Based on data of all A-share listed companies from 1999 to 2007,the paper makes an empirical research on payperformance sensitivity with respect to pay gap.The pay gap could be divided into pay gap between executives and pay gap between executives and employees.A positive relationship between the pay gap and firms＇ performance of China＇s listed firms can be found,which supports tournament theory.And pay gap as an incentive affects non-SOE firms more strongly.Moreover,the extent to which executives control the board of directors may affect pay gap.As an alternative mechanism for the compensation system,management shareholding and management turnover has a negative correlation with pay gap.Firms＇ size has a significant effect on pay gap and the pay control of SOE since 2004 weakens correlation between pay gap and the performance.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期86-93,共8页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
薪酬差距
公司治理
经营业绩
pay dispersion
corporate governance
performance
作者简介
胥佚萱（1976-），女，四川南充人，上海财经大学会计学院博士研究生，研究方向是资本市场会计。
