摘要
为了解决装备采购承包商利用信息优势而在装备研制中隐藏行动、降低质量、提高成本的问题,采用激励型定价的方法,对成本质量的双目标定价激励模型进行了研究。结果表明:在装备采购过程中承包商与军队之间具有明显的信息不对称性;装备采购定价参数的不同选择会对承包商正负效用造成不同程度的影响,从而决定了承包商在降低成本和提高质量方面付出不同的努力。在承包商正负效用线性递增和边际正负效用递增(递减)两种不同假设的基础上,通过对定价参数、承包商努力程度、承包商效用以及采购性价比之间的关系进行研究,提出了定量选择定价参数激励的方法。该研究对装备采购的多目标激励问题和委托代理问题的研究具有一定的指导意义。
To prevent the contractors from using their information predominance to hide their activities of reducing manufacturing cost by lowering equipment quality in equipment acquisition,this study develops a model of double-incentive on cost and quality for creating an incentive pricing system.The study shows that there is severe asymmetric information in equipment acquisition between contractors and army.The determination of pricing parameters can significantly affect the contractor＇s utility.Based on the assumption of two kinds of contractor＇s utility,i.e.utility linearity increase and marginal utility increase （descent）,this study investigates the relationship among price,cost,contractor＇s efforts and contractor＇s utility,and develops a method for choosing the parameters of pricing system quantitatively.This study provides a solution for the multi-aim incentive problems,also offers a new way to investigate the principal-agent problems.
出处
《辽宁工程技术大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2010年第2期300-303,共4页
Journal of Liaoning Technical University (Natural Science)
基金
国家社会科学基金军事学基金资助项目(06QJ798-216)
关键词
装备采购
定价参数
激励模型
equipment acquisition
pricing parameter
incentive model
作者简介
张涛（1977-），男，山东泰安人，博士研元生，工程师，主要从事装备采购理论与应用方面的研究。
