摘要
本文分析了消费信贷市场上隐含担保导致系统性违约的可能性。本文指出,由于存在政府隐含担保,金融机构防范系统性违约的激励会被削弱,对与系统性因素相关的违约将进行理性的忽视。因此本文认为,在讨论我国防范消费信贷违约风险时,不能只注重完善风险防范的制度而忽视了金融机构防范风险的主观激励。本文还对弱化隐含担保提供了一定的政策建议。
This article analyzes the possibility of systematic default caused by implicit guarantee. It concludes that due to the implicit guarantee, it becomes a rational choice for the financial institutions to ignore the default caused by systematic factors, which may lead to perverse default on consumer credit market and even threaten the stability of the whole financial system. Therefore, in order to prevent default risk in China, the incentive of financial institutions is not a negligible factor.
出处
《特区经济》
北大核心
2010年第1期65-66,共2页
Special Zone Economy
基金
北京市优秀人才培养资助项目(项目编号:PYZZ090424001546)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
消费信贷
隐含担保
违约
consumer credit
implicit guarantee
default
