摘要
松花江流域的水质问题日益严峻。2005年11月发生的松花江重大水污染事件再次表明,加强企业污染防治和强化环境监督管理仍将是今后一段时间水污染防治的重要任务。利用博弈论的纳什均衡分析方法,对污染物排放过程中政府监管与企业污染治理的实际决策行为进行了博弈分析,并对流域水污染防治和水环境保护提出了利用市场手段、加强水环境监管制度等若干建议。
The problem of water quality of Songhua River Basin is becoming more and more serious. The water pollution incident of Songhua River occurred in November, 2005 indicates that, strengthening the enterprise＇ s pollution prevention and the government＇ s supervision is the most important work in near future. Using Nash equilibrium in game theory, this paper conducts a game analysis of actual decision making behavior of enterprises pollution con- trol and government~ supervision in process of pollutant drainage. It puts forward some suggestions about water pollution prevention and water environment protection for the basin, for instance taking advantage of measures of market, strengthening the supervision system for water environment etc.
出处
《自然灾害学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第3期95-98,共4页
Journal of Natural Disasters
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(06BJL033)
关键词
博弈
水污染
松花江流域
纳什均衡
game
water pollution
Songhua River Basin
Nash equilibrium
作者简介
谢永刚（1964-），男，教授，主要从事灾害经济学的教学与研究．Email：xieyg@hlju．edu．cn
