摘要
根据现实生活中普遍存在的经纪人跟风现象,提出并研究了一维周期链结构中混合单向模仿少数者博弈模型.在该模型中,将经纪人置于一维周期链结构中,一部分经纪人可以模仿其左侧邻居的行为,采取相应的决定;另一部分经纪人维持基本少数者博弈的规则进行决策.研究发现,当记忆容量m较小时,系统表现比原始的少数者博弈模型要好.随着可参与模仿的经纪人人数N0的增加,系统方差呈下降趋势,体现出引入模仿的有效性.当m增大时,随着N0的增加,系统方差呈现一定的上升趋势,体现出引入模仿对经纪人预测能力的抑制作用.
A mixed single directional imitational minority game is proposed according to the phenomenon that agents can imitate in real life. Agents are put in one dimensional periodic chain, some agents can imitate their left-hand neighbor to make decisions and others just make choices based on their own strategies. Results show that system performance is better than that without imitation, and system variance decreases with increasing imitational agent number NO for small memory size m, which exhibits the validity of imitation. System variance in creases with increasing NO for large m, which indicates the inhibition to forecast ability for agents.
出处
《纺织高校基础科学学报》
CAS
2009年第1期94-97,共4页
Basic Sciences Journal of Textile Universities
关键词
一维周期链
模仿
混合少数者博弈
one dimensional periodic chain
imitation
mixed minority game
作者简介
通讯作者：全宏俊（1958-），男，湖南省衡南县人，华南理工大学教授．E-mail：hjquan@seut．edu．cn
