摘要
不对称信息和电子商务的虚拟性使交易双方互不信任,交易活动难以为继。运用道德风险模型、逆向选择模型和信号传递模型对第三方支付作用机理进行分析可以看出,电子商务活动中引入独立的第三方支付充当信用中介,以第三方支付的安全性和稳定性替代电子商务活动中使用商业信用的风险性和不稳定性,减少了电子商务活动中的道德风险和逆向选择行为,同时,通过信号传递减少了不对称信息,从而以此为基础建立了交易信用关系,解决了电子商务活动中买卖双方的信用问题,推动了电子商务的持续快速发展。
Asymmetric information and virtuality of electronic commerce make buyers and sellers distrust each other, and lead to the transaction boycott. After analyzing the operation mechanism of the third payment through moral hazard model, adverse selection model and signaling model, the result shows that the independent third party payment, which works in electronic commerce as a credit medium, due ,to its safety and stability can substitute for commercial credit in electronic commerce, which is risky and unstable, and decrease moral hazard behavior and adverse selection behavior in electronic commerce. Asymmetric information can be reduced by signaling. The transaction credit based on the third party payment settles the problem of credit between buyers and sellers in electronic commerce and promotes the continuous and fast development of electronic commerce.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期11-17,共7页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70771087)
西安交通大学"985工程"二期项目(07200701)
关键词
第三方支付
作用机理
不对称信息
交易模式
the third party payment
operation mechanism
asymmetric information
trade model
作者简介
李育林（1971-），男，陕西乾县人，西安交通大学经济与金融学院博士研究生，高级经济师，主要从事第三方支付、资产定价研究。
