摘要
企业在向银行寻求信贷融资时遇到的信贷腐败可分为两类:金融机构中主管信贷审批的高层人员的审批腐败;负责信贷发放的基层人员的支付腐败。通过分析两种类型的腐败在项目寻求信贷融资时的影响,揭示信贷腐败与信贷融资之间的关系,指出两类腐败具有相互影响的关系,基层支付腐败对信贷融资项目产生逆向选择,阻止了低风险项目的信贷融资行为,而高层人员倾向于和融资项目合作,因而具有减少基层机构支付腐败的动机。
This paper distinguishes two kinds of corruption facing the entrepreneurs in the credit market： approval corruption and disbursement corruption. Disbursement corruption refers to the fact that entrepreneurs pay bribes to low - level disbursement officials in a credit disbursing bureaucracy before the realization of project returns, and approval corruption has been associated with bribes that entrepreneurs are required to pay to high - level officials after the realization of project returns. This paper, through analyzing the effects of these two kinds of credit corruption on projects financing, reveals the relationship between credit corruption and projects financing： the two corruptions affect each other and it finds that low - level disbursement officials have adverse selection to financing projects, but high - level approval officials have incentives to cooperate and support in programs directed at eliminating corruption in lower -level credit disbursing bureaucracies.
出处
《广东商学院学报》
2008年第4期45-51,共7页
Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
基金
重庆市教育委员会科学技术研究资助项目(KJ081603)
关键词
信贷腐败
项目腐败
审批腐败
支付腐败
credit corruption
projects financing
approval corruption
disbursement corruption
作者简介
南旭光（1978-），男，江苏徐州人，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生，重庆广播电视大学讲师。
