厂商参与约束和激励约束之相容——一个关于地方政府与流通厂商之委托代理的理论探讨被引量：12

The Amalgamation of Manufacturer's Participant Restriction and Incentive Restriction—A Discussion on Principal-Agent Between Local Government and Distributors

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摘要激励规制理论关于委托代理及其对应的参与约束和激励约束的分析,通常集中在以公用事业的委托代理为主要研究对象的产业和部门,而对流通产业有可能存在的相关问题并没有给以足够的关注。其实,流通产业中的委托代理关系,同样存在着厂商的参与约束和激励约束问题。本文在简要评说有关委托代理的激励性规制理论的基础上,认为要实现厂商满足于参与约束和激励约束之相容的较好结果,可以考虑糅合现有的理论成果并根据我国的具体实际,在框架设计上为地方政府委托代理提供一些思路;作为一种理论探讨,文章对地方政府之于厂商的参与约束和激励约束之相容问题进行了讨论。 The analysis on participant restriction and incentive restriction in incentive regulatory theory focuses generally on public utility sectors,and pays little attention on distribution industry.Actually,there is also a problem on manufacturer's participant restriction and incentive restriction in principal-agent connection of distribution in- dustry.Based on the brief theoretic comment,this paper discusses the amalgamation of manufacturer's partici- pant restriction and incentive restriction,and offers some training of thought for local government's principal-a- gent management.

作者何大安

机构地区浙江工商大学经济学院

出处《财贸经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第11期71-76,共6页 Finance & Trade Economics

基金本文是教育部重大规划课题"跨国公司投资对我国流通产业的影响及其对策研究"的一个子项目(编号06jjd790038)。

关键词流通产业激励规制委托代理参与约束激励约束 Distribution Industry Incentive Regulatory Principal-Agent Participant Restriction Incentive Restriction

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介何大安，浙江工商大学经济学院院长，教育部重点研究基地浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心教授，博士生导师，

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