摘要
商业银行的“危机短视症”,使银行承担了相对其资本实力较大的风险敞口。由高杠杆和信息不对称所导致的不正当激励会使资产投资项目的融资风险转嫁给银行。银行在安全网的激励下,更愿意承担风险大的信贷项目。
The crisis myopia in commercial banks has led banks to shoulder larger risk exposures compared with their capital power, Malfeasance resulting from high lever and information asymmetry will transfer the financing risks from investment projects to banks, On the other hand, banks, stimulated by safety net, are willing to undertake credit projects with higher risks. The empirical data from China＇s real estate industry support the above conclusion.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
2006年第6期53-59,共7页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
作者简介
段军山（1971-），男，湖南常德人，广东商学院金融学院讲师，金融学博士，研究方向：商业银行与风险管理．
