激励为什么失效——理论、实践及启示被引量：11

Why Incentive Fails: Theory,Practice and Implication

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摘要激励机制能够减少或消除不对称信息下资源配置所带来的效率损失,然而这一机制在现实中却常常失效,为解释这一问题,首先从整体框架上回顾激励理论,了解其模型构造的基本思想;其次考察激励机制从理论到现实的接口,从模型上分析其对现实模拟的偏差;最后要考虑到现实激励机制设计是局限条件下的选择,从实践结果来剖析具体激励方式选择的矛盾与冲突。解决激励失效问题主要依赖于两个途径,一是各种激励方式的结合与协调,二是激励的同时采用监管。 Incentive mechanism can decrease or eliminate efficiency loss brought by resource allocation under asymmetric information. However, it always fails in reality. To explain this, the paper reviews the incentive theory from the whole framework, investigates the interface between theory and practice, and analyzes the deviance mathematically. At last, the paper considers that the design of incentive mechanism is the choice under constraints, and analyzes the paradox and clash of diffe^nt incentive methods in practice. There are two ways to solve this problem： one is＂ to combine and coordinate different incentive methods; the other is to use incentive and monitor at the same time.

作者张巍

机构地区东北财经大学数量经济系

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 2006年第4期22-28,共7页 Journal of Management Science

关键词激励信号业绩补偿 incentive signal performance compensation

分类号 C936 [经济管理—管理学]

作者简介张巍（1978-），男，辽宁抚顺人，东北财经大学博士研究生，研究方向：优化决策等。

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