摘要
在简化的Lucas-Prescott(1974)的模型基础上,本文说明了失业保险中失业保险金对搜寻努力存在着负效用,并分别就无失业保险、完全失业保险、不完全失业保险、失业保险金过低等四种情况,分析了道德风险的产生机制以及克服道德风险的激励机制。针对失业保险中的道德风险问题,本文提出了相应的政策建议:失业期内单调下降的失业保险金支付方法,征收失业保险税或奖励再就业,对失业工人的搜寻努力进行监督和惩罚,执行劳动福利计划等。
This paper is based on a simple theory model that considers unemployment insurance benefit and employment tax. Under the constraint of self - financed unemployment policy organized by the government, the paper analyzes how does moral hazard come forth. And the paper offers methods to solve the problem of incentives of job search. Finally, the paper puts forward suggestions to deal with the moral hazard problem in unemployment insurance.
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期84-93,共10页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
关键词
失业保险
道德风险
搜寻
自我保险
隐性就业
Unemployment Insurance
Moral Hazard
Job Search
Self - financed Policy
Implicit Employment
