摘要
专用性投资是为某一特定公司或价值链上的合作伙伴提供的,它是公司营销战略的重要组成部分,这种投资具有可见的风险,因为它使投资接受方有机会剥夺投资方的利益。因此考察剥夺的情形以及一个经销商如何通过4种控制手段更好的管理这些交易性专用投资潜在可能被套牢的风险,并粘合投资接受方,在特定条件下减少机会主义。并认为随着控制手段的水平超出一定范围,专用性投资对机会主义的影响会发生转变。
Specific investments, which are tailored to a particular company or value-chain partner, are important components of firms' marketing strategies. At the same time, such investments pose considerable risk, because they put the receiver in a position to opportunistically exploit the investor. This paper examines this "expropriation" scenario but also considers whether specific investments may actually "bond" the receiver and reduce opportunism under certain conditions. The key theoretical argument is that the effect of specific investments on opportunism will shift in a nonmonotonic fashion over the range of these relationship conditions.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2006年第2期22-32,共11页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70302007)
关键词
专用性投资
机会主义
关系准则
关系持续性
明确的契约
specific investments
opportunism
relationship norms
relationship's time horizon
explicit contracts
作者简介
汪涛(1970-),男,湖北襄樊人,毕业于武汉大学.获博士学位,现任武汉大学经济与管理学院市场营销与旅游管理系主任,教授、博士生导师,研究方向:市场营销等