摘要
通过改进现有模型,将知情者私人信息的准确程度降低,从而使知情者可以长时间重复操纵市场.研究表明,知情者在拥有信息的基础上,还必须使公众相信知情者的老实程度,才能引导公众的信念,从而够操纵市场;可能改变类型(老实或不老实)的知情者的长期均衡是公众不可能完全知道其类型,市场上始终有信息的传递,并且其可信度大于1/2.
An existing model available in literature was modified to degrade the accuracy of private information from an informer, so that he can manipulate the securities market repeatedly in a long period. The analysis result shows that, the informer has to make the public believe in his honesty to lead the public＇s believes in the assets and manipulate the market. The long-period equilibrium of an informer who may change his statuses between honesty and dishonesty is that it is impossible for the public to fully know his status, information transfer keeps on and his creditability is more than 1/2.
出处
《西南交通大学学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第5期684-689,共6页
Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University
关键词
市场操纵
证券市场
博弈模型
知情者
market manipulation
securities market
game model
informer
作者简介
张永鹏（1975-），男，讲师，博士研究生，研究方向为博弈理论应用、金融工程．
