摘要
为了研究中央政府和大江大河的左、右岸地方政府在防洪减灾中的相互影响和相互作用及其均衡,构造了由中央政府和两个地方政府作为参与人的复杂博弈模型,构成内层问题有关联的两阶Stackelberg问题,利用基于可行域分析的遍历全局搜索法对该数学模型进行了求解,并完成两个案例的计算.研究发现中央政府增加防洪投资并不必然导致防洪投资总额的增加,相反会引起地方政府的防洪减灾投资的减少,因而中央政府应该淡化自身的投资人的角色,而更多地关注如何通过机制对地方政府的防洪投资进行引导,从而实现全社会的最优配置.
The purpose is to investigate the interactions and mter-impacts among governments at different levels in flood hazard mitigation. A two-level Stackelberg problem was established to model the flood hazard mitigation games among the central government and two interacting local governments. Rubinstein Law in Game Theory and Khun-Tucher Conditions for non-linear optimization problems helped in transforming the original problem into computable one. An overall searching algorithm finally solved the problem based on analysis of the feasible zone. Computation of two cases suggests that increase of investment in flood control by the central government tend to result in decrease of corresponding input by the local governments. This finding recommends that the central government should step down in its traditional role as a dominating investor and turn to stimulate local investments in the field of flood hazard mitigation.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第2期67-73,共7页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
