摘要
联合生产是一种内含竞争与合作的生产方式。一方面,总产出的共享性促进了合作的产生;另一方面,产出的个体分享性又给参与人的竞相投机提供了竞争性的刺激。因此,通过产权安排确立合理的分享原则,构成了联合生产决策的核心命题。本文以效用理论为基础,交叉地运用博弈论和福利经济学的分析方法,通过中性产权安排、激励性产权安排和惩罚性产权安排的界定,比较了不同产权安排下联合生产的决策和效率问题。
As a mode of production, combined production is the one including competition as well as corporation. The shared aggregate production facilitates the birth of corporation; meanwhile, the individually shared production affords competition stimulation to participants to make their venture. That's why the proper sharing principle, which is set by property rights settlements, is the core of combined production policy. Based on utility theory, this article employed and intersected the analysis methods of game theory and welfare economics, and gave definition of various property rights settlements such as neutral, positive (encouraging), and negative (punishing), aiming at the comparison of policies and efficiency of combined production with different property rights settlements.
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第2期33-41,共9页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
关键词
产权安排
联合生产
决策
Property Rights Settlements
Combined Production
Policy
