摘要
如今已有许多的关于BOT组织结构、实施步骤、融资途径和风险分配等问题的研究,但是关于特许权期限决定方法的研究却很少。特许权期限的界定直接关系到东道国政府与项目公司的利益分配,如果期限偏长,则东道国的利益受损;如果期限偏短,则影响项目公司的利益,进而导致BOT方式失败。因此,本文介绍了一个关于BOT融资项目特许权期限的决策模型,该模型既保护了项目公司的利益,又保护了东道国的利益。
Previous studies have developed various techniques and methodsmainly suggesting organization structure contracting proceduresmethods of project financing and risk allocation when BOT projects are implemented. Nevertheless it appears that little has been undertaken in studying the way to determine the concession period in a BOT contract. Decision of concession period directly affects allocation of interests between project enterprise and host country.Too long or too short of this period would make the project enterprise or host counry have a loss. Thusthis paper develops an sidecision model of concession period for build-operate-transfer infrastructure projects which can satisfy the interests of investor and host country.
出处
《铁道工程学报》
EI
2004年第4期117-120,124,共5页
Journal of Railway Engineering Society
