摘要
分析风险投资中的双重道德风险问题,构造一个模型就如何签订最佳合约来达到对双方的激励进行 分析,为风险投资中的双重道德风险问题提供解决思路。
Double moral hazard in venture capital financing is studied in this thesis, and a model is set up to analyze incentives enforced on both sides aiming at an optimal outturn. And a solution has been reached to solve the double moral hazard in venture capital financing.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第11期71-73,共3页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371033)
关键词
风险投资
双重道德风险
激励
最优合约
Venture Capital Finance
Double Moral Hazard
Incentive
Optimal Contract
