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基于职业观念的隐性激励机制 被引量:6

Recessive Incentive Mechanism Based on Professional Concern
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摘要 员工现在的努力水平和能力水平要影响现在的绩效水平,员工的绩效水平要影响市场对于其能力的判断,进而影响其将来的报酬,这就是典型的隐性激励机制,即职业观念。将员工的报酬建立在纯粹的产量水平之上的激励机制是显性激励机制。职业观念和显性激励机制对于员工的激励表现为替代关系,所以应当对员工的激励进行总体优化。年轻员工的职业观念较强,因此可以放松对年轻员工的显性激励,临近退休的员工,其职业观念已经大大弱化,应将其报酬更多地建立在当期的绩效水平之上。
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 2004年第4期50-54,共5页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 教育部高校博士学科点专项科研基金(20020611009)
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