摘要
研究了零售商打折促销情形下的二级供应链合作广告问题。在价格敏感性条件下,构建了制造商占主导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨了供应链成员共同协作的Nash合作博弈模型,通过比较分析,得到了制造商和零售商选择合作情况下的广告水平、价格折扣、订货量和整条供应链收益均大于不合作情况下对应值的结论。研究给出了不同博弈下零售商的折扣范围,并且证明了在考虑零售商提供折扣情形下的广告水平与订货量均大于不提供折扣情形下的对应值的结论。通过数值算例对有关结论进行了验证和说明。
Cooperative advertising problem in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the retailer offers discount to customers is studied.Under price sensitive setting,the Stackelberg leader-follower game with the manufacturer as a leader and Nash co-op game are investigated,respectively.It is shown that all the advertising level,discount price,ordering quantity and system profit when the members choose cooperative strategy are larger than those without cooperation.Furthermore,the ranges of discount price of the retailer are exproled in different game.For any given price discount,the advertising level of the manufacturer or the retailer,ordering quantity are larger than those without discount.Finally,numerical examples are given to confirm the relevant conclusion.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第S2期468-473,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071075
71173103)
教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(12YJC630180)
关键词
供应链
合作广告
博弈论
价格折扣
supply chain
cooperative advertising
game theory
price discount
