摘要
基于廉租房退出所具有的博弈特征,提出了针对住户和政府的策略形式及期望收益的研究假设;针对廉租房退出体系中住户与政府的决策问题,采用博弈思想建立决策模型;通过对符合条件住户、不符合条件住户及政府的最优策略的选择,推导出了政府严格审核情况下发现不符合条件住户的概率对博弈双方的影响,进而通过对各自期望收益的分析,得出在政府严格审核情况下发现不符合条件住户概率的大小处于不同阶段时住户与政府的均衡解;通过案例分析,在政府严格审核情况下发现不符合条件住户的概率处于不同范围时,求取住户与政府的最优选择,验证了模型的有效性。
Based on the game characteristics that the low-rent housing exit have,assumptions for households and the government's strategy and the expected return are put up. For low-rent housing exit system w ith the government's decision-making problems,this paper uses the game theory to establish a decisionmaking model. Through the selection of the optimal strategy for eligible and ineligible households and government,it's derived that the effect of the probability of non-qualifying households has on both sides under the government's strict audit situation. Thus,by analyzing every expected revenue,equilibrium solution is obtained for households and government at different stages of the probability of non-qualifying households in the case of strict government audit situation. Through case study,the optimal choice is found for households and government at different ranges of the probability of non-qualifying households under strict government audit situation. The experiment also verifies the validity of the model.
出处
《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》
2014年第2期153-157,共5页
Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC630122)
关键词
廉租房
政府
住户
博弈
监管
low-rent housing
government
household
game
supervision
