摘要
银行的改革进行了二十几年,虽然取得了阶段性的成果,但却没有从本质上解决银行的巨额不良资产问题。本文通过建立两阶段的动态博弈模型,分析了政府与国有银行之间的利益博弈行为,阐明国有银行不良资产之所以仍然不断涌现,是由于政府对银行产权份额的过多控制而导致的。在此基础上,提出了推进彻底的银行产权制度改革、完善银行的法人治理结构的建议,以便从根本上减少银行的不良资产。
China' s banking reforms have been underway for more than two decades, and have gained positive results. However, they have not been successful in completely resolving the problem of tremendous NPL. By presenting a two-staged dynamic game model, this paper maintains that the non-performing assets of the state-owned commercial banks are created mainly because of the game strategies between the government and the state-owned commercial bank by which each party endeavors to maximize its respectively interest. Based on this analysis, the paper sets forth the idea to implement the complete property right system reform and establish the complete structure of corporate governance to thoroughly decrease the non-performing loan.
出处
《上海商学院学报》
2006年第4期19-23,共5页
Business Economic Review
基金
国家自然基金(70573033)
关键词
不良资产
产权制度
动态博弈
Non-performing loan (NPL) , property right system,dynamic game
作者简介
童冬华,女,华侨大学商学院金融专业硕士研究生,研究方向:金融工程与金融管理研究.
陈金龙,男,华侨大学工商管理学院教授,博士,研究方向:金融工程与金融管理研究.
