摘要
长期以来,我国的证券市场缺少一个有效的上市公司退出机制。这样的制度设计造成了监管层面和上市公司治理层面各方激励约束的恶性循环,不利于激励上市公司提高质量。延伸到宏观层面,突出的表现为国内证券市场的低迷及其功能的削弱。我们的实证研究表明,尽管我国上市公司的整体质量在近几年来有所提高,但以贷款利率或债券收益率为标准衡量的整体投资价值仍旧不高。而且绩效差的上市公司比重过高,并且其数量仍在不断增加。为了解决制约证券市场发展的激励机制问题并实现其功能定位的调整,我们建议应完善上市公司的退市制度。
In China there has been no effective delisting system for a long time that lead to a vicious circle both for the supervisions and corporate governance of listed companies.This empirical analysis shows that although the quality of listed companies as a whole has been improved in recent years,the investment return of the mar- ket is still lower than bank s loan rate and corporate bond rate and the large number of junk stocks is still in- creasing.The authors point out that a perfect delisting system is the ke...
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第11期17-32,共16页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
证券市场
上市公司
投资价值
激励
退市
securities market
listed company
ST
investment value
incentive
delisting
