摘要
如今,围标行为在招投标活动中频频发生,而且有愈演愈烈之势,如何限制围标行为的发生已经纳入招标人制定招标办法时考虑的范畴。最近渐渐兴起的最高限价招标作为限制围标,保障业主和国家的利益的一种招标办法,正在引起许多业主单位和各地政府的关注。本文通过运用博弈理论和经济学的分析工具,探究了最高限价招标对围标的影响机理,从而证明了最高限价招标能够有效地限制围标行为的发生。
Now besieging bidding becomes common increasingly,so the measures to restrict besieging bidding activities haven been taken into the owner's account. Recently the Price-fixing Bidding,as a new arisen bidding way to restrict besieging bidding activities and to protect the profits of owners and nation,is attracting the attention from several owners and local governments.This paper analyzes the Price-fixing Bidding's influence on besieging bidding based on game theory and economic analytical methods.Then it is proved that the Price-fixing Bidding can restrict besieging bidding activities efficiently.
出处
《基建优化》
2007年第5期95-98,共4页
Optimization of Capital Construction
关键词
围标
最高限价招标
博弈
besieging bidding
Price-fixing Bidding
Game
作者简介
曾莹莹(1982-),女,重庆人,硕士研究生,研究方向:工程项目管理和合同管理.
