摘要
According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.
基金
funded by grants from the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71772029)
LiaoNing Revitalization Talents Program(No.XLYC2007052)
Tax Accounting Research Center of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
作者简介
Hang Liu,E-mail address:liuhang@dufe.edu.cn
