摘要
提出一种基于动态贝叶斯博弈的攻防博弈模型,克服传统工程设计中仅考虑单方决策的弊端,充分考虑综合防护方和武器打击方的收益以及双方策略的变化因素,计算出双方最优策略集,使攻击前后防护方的设计策略保持稳定,结果也更加可靠。
An attack and defense model based on dynamic Bayesian game has been proposed.It overcomes the disadvantages of the traditional engineering design which only considers unilaterally,takes into account the benefits of both defender and attacker as well as the variation factors of both sides’strategies,and calculates the optimal strategy set of both sides.Before and after the attack,the design strategy of the defender is stable and the result is reliable.
作者
耿昊
卢浩
黄牧
孙善政
郑辰翔
GENG Hao;LU Hao;HUANG Mu;SUN Shanzheng;ZHENG Chenxiang(State Key Laboratory of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation of Explosion and Impact,Army Engineering University of PLA,Nanjing 210007,China;The No.95979th Troop of PLA,Shenyang 110000,China)
出处
《兵器装备工程学报》
CAS
北大核心
2020年第2期209-215,共7页
Journal of Ordnance Equipment Engineering
基金
国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(2017YFC0804702).
关键词
博弈论
防护工程
动态贝叶斯博弈
设计策略
攻防对抗
game theory
protection engineering
dynamic Bayesian game
design strategy
attackdefense confrontation
作者简介
耿昊(1992—),男,硕士研究生,助理讲师,主要从事防护工程毁伤评估研究,E-mail:genghao0714@163.com;通讯作者:卢浩(1987—),男,博士,讲师,主要从事防护工程毁伤评估研究,E-mail:lh829829@163.com。
