摘要
信息经济学领域中的信号传递理论为分析科场活动提供一个新的视角。在科场中,考官与考生之间所拥有的信息不对称且无法直接沟通,需要求助于间接的信号加以传递。考生可视为“信号发送者”,通过写作可被观察的优秀科文“信号”,将自身道德、才识、能力等传递给考官,考官作为“信号接收者”,根据过往阅卷标准与个人喜好,对考生的科文作出甄别与筛选。考官的出题偏好与评判标准作为反馈机制,进一步引导考生调整自身科文信号,使科场取士达至“均衡”状态。同时,社会对“以文取士”观念的高度认同、政府革新举措的积极推动为科文信号的产生和传递提供了良好的文化环境与制度保障。
The signaling theory in economics can provide a new perspective for the analysis of imperial examination/keju activities:since the information between them is asymmetric,the examiner and the examinee fail to communicate with each other directly,so they need to resort to indirect signals for interaction.The candidates/examiners,regarded as“signaler,”write excellent essays to demonstrate their morality,talent and ability to the examinees;while the examinees,as the“receiver”,based on the examiners’scores of the articles plus examinees’personal preferences,try to discriminate and select the candidates.Meanwhile,the candidates can use the feedbacks-the examiners’evaluation criteria and preferences to help them with their next essay writings.By this way,keju exam has achieved its goal of talent-choosing by means of essay writing.Actually,the acceptance of“selecting talents/scholars by essays in Keju”,and the innovation measures taken by the government,have offered a kind of cultural and institutional guarantee for the generation and transmission of the signal,the essays.
作者
毛鹏程
Mao Pengcheng(College of Teacher Education,Wenzhou University,Wenzhou,Zhejiang 325035,China)
出处
《湖北招生考试》
2023年第5期34-40,59,共8页
Enrollment and Examination in Hubei
关键词
信息不对称
信号传递理论
科举制度
科场
科文
information asymmetry
signaling theory
imperial examination/keju system
examination hall
examination essays for keju
作者简介
毛鹏程,浙江衢州人,温州大学教育学院讲师,主要从事高等教育历史与理论、科举学研究。
