摘要
本文系统研究董事高管责任保险(以下简称D&O保险)与审计质量之间关系。基于我国A股上市公司2009-2022年的数据,本文实证分析了D&O保险对审计质量的影响。结果表明,上市公司购买D&O保险后能显著提升其审计质量,而且该结果在稳健性检验之后依然成立,研究结果说明D&O保险确实发挥了积极的外部治理作用。通过异质性分析发现,D&O保险与审计质量之间的关系受到公司董事会规模、盈利能力和代理成本的影响。具体来说,公司盈利能力越强、董事会规模越大或者代理成本低的公司购买D&O保险更容易提高审计质量。本文从盈余管理的角度切入,证实了企业购买D&O保险确实会显著提高其审计质量,研究的结果对D&O保险的治理效应有了更深刻的认识,为后续国内D&O保险的推广提供了理论依据和经验支持。
To examine the external governance effect of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O insurance),this study empirically analyzes the impact of D&O insurance on audit quality using data from Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2022.The results demonstrate that the purchase of D&O insurance significantly enhances audit quality,and this finding remains robust even after conducting robustness tests,indicating the positive governance role played by D&O insurance.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the relationship between D&O insurance and audit quality is influenced by factors such as board size,profitability,and agency costs.Specifically,companies with higher profitability,larger board size,or lower agency costs are more likely to improve audit quality through the purchase of D&O insurance.By examining earnings management,this study provides empirical evidence on the audit consequences of D&O insurance,deepening our und erstanding of the governance effects of D&O insurance and providing theoretical and empirical support for the subsequent promotion of D&O insurance in China's domestic market.
作者
张瑞纲
唐德胜
Zhang Ruigang;Tang Desheng(Guangxi University)
出处
《金融发展评论》
2023年第12期80-92,共13页
Financial Development Review
基金
作者所主持的国家自然科学基金项目成果,项目名称:董事责任保险、企业特征与企业风险行为,项目批准号:71863002。
关键词
董事高管责任保险
盈余管理
审计质量
监督治理
机会主义
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance
Earnings Management
Audit Qualty
Supervisory Govermnance
Opportunism
Corporate Governance.
作者简介
张瑞纲,经济学博士,副教授,硕士生导师,副主任,广西大学经济学院;通讯作者:唐德胜,金融学硕士生,广西大学经济学院,Email:1169040421@qq.com。
