摘要
发行人付费模式是域外监管看门人的逻辑起点,但国内法学界对该模式的改革鲜有问津;金融领域的文献虽对此问题多有涉及,但对规则设计的讨论十分有限。理论分析与实证证据表明,全面转型为投资者付费模式以及付费与聘用权分离这两种颠覆性改革方案的成本过高。基于成本收益的考量,监管应该选择的路径是:一方面,允许发行人付费与投资人付费这两种模式自由发展,让投资者可在两种具有不同程度的利冲风险服务中进行选择;另一方面,可以采用成本相对较低的方式对发行人付费模式进行干预。具体有以下三种可行的方案:特定情形下的“监管机构指定看门人”,是将有限的监管资源集中应用于利冲风险最高的情形;执业质量评分机制,是对检查结果的进一步“可视化”,以通过助力声誉机制来激励看门人注重服务质量而不是迎合发行人;关键人员的强制轮换,是从时间维度上减少发行人付费模式带来的发行人与看门人之间的利益勾连。
The issuer-pay model has raised global regulators’concerns about conflicts of interest of gatekeepers,while domestic legal scholarship pays little attention to how to reform this model.Financial literature has documented empirical evidence for this issue,but it fails to provide a comparative study for regulators.Based on theoretical and empirical evidence,a full transformation to the investor-pay model and the separation of payment and selection are both inefficient options.On the one hand,these two payment models should be allowed,so that there are two types of services with different degrees of conflicts of interest risk for investors to choose.On the other hand,regulation should intervene in a relatively balanced manner incurring lower costs.Specifically,it is practical and feasible to empower regulators to assign gatekeepers in cases where the conflicts of interest problem is particularly serious;the grading system based on service quality can make the results of inspection more salient and improve the reputation mechanism,thus prompting gatekeepers to pursue quality instead of catering to the issuer;the mandatory rotation rule is to reduce the economic connection between the issuer and the gatekeeper by limiting the length of their relationship.
出处
《金融监管研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期1-21,共21页
Financial Regulation Research
关键词
看门人
发行人付费
投资者付费
利益冲突
成本收益分析
Gatekeeper
Issuer-pay Model
Investor-pay Model
Conflicts of Interest
Cost-benefit Analysis
作者简介
邹星光,法学博士研究生,北京大学法学院,联系方式:zouxingguang@pku.edu.cn。
