摘要
中央银行数字货币的发行会降低商业银行的存款供给,影响金融体系的货币创造能力与宏观经济稳定性吗?本文构建多种货币竞争共存的环境,依托货币的交易媒介属性对中国人民银行设计的中央银行数字货币(DC/EP)进行理论建模。研究结论表明,交易网络化和可控匿名的特征使DC/EP在交易费用和交易安全性上与传统支付工具存在明显差异。独特的交易支付特性深刻影响了DC/EP的相对竞争力,部分社会公众能从DC/EP交易中获益更多,从而促使他们改变交易决策,最终潜在降低银行存款市场的实际供给水平、抑制商业银行的盈利能力。本文建议商业银行和中央银行应具体评估发行DC/EP对其存款供给的潜在影响,适度降低商户的转账支付费用,关注DC/EP发行的相关配套措施,以提高存款货币的竞争力,稳定商业银行的存贷款业务。
On the one hand,the high ultimate control can restrict the behavior of shareholder and managers and then reduce the two kinds of agency cost;on the other hand,the ultimate controllers can do tunneling themselves and reduce the value of the company.However,there is no certain conclusion about this topic.And there is little research about the special effect of government control considering the government incentive.Our research shows that(1)when the control rights is small,the value of the firm decreases when the control rights increases,while when the control rights is large enough,the value of the firm increases when the control rights increases;(2)the government as a special ultimate controller,will use this mechanism to intervene the firm from different sectors,and then intervene the industry structure,from which they can balance the fiscal and GDP incentive with the smallest cost.We analyzed the effect and mechanism of government intervention on micro firms and macro economy,and then explained the relationship among government incentive,control structure and industry structure.
作者
郭红玉
任点点
杨美超
Hongyu Guo;Diandian Ren;Meichao Yang(School of Finance and Banking,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China)
出处
《金融科学》
2022年第1期54-81,共28页
Financial Science
基金
对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(20YQ14)
国家社会科学基金项目(20BJY245)
作者简介
郭红玉,对外经济贸易大学金融学院,教授,研究方向:宏观金融理论与政策、商业银行信贷管理理论与实践;任点点,对外经济贸易大学金融学院,博士研究生,研究方向:宏观金融理论与政策、商业银行信贷管理理论与实践;杨美超,对外经济贸易大学金融学院,博士研究生,研究方向:宏观金融理论与政策、商业银行信贷管理理论与实践。
