摘要
                
                    According to the philosophy of self-cultivation that"one should refine his personal virtue when in poverty,and help save the world when in success",a new type of evolutionary strategy,PoorCompetition-Rich-Cooperation(PCRC),is proposed.To discuss its superiority and inferiority,based on a multi-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game,PCRC and other six kinds of strategies are played by using the roulette method in three different populations(a uniformly distributed population,a cooperation-preference population,a defection-preference population).The payoff characteristics for each strategy under different temptation coefficients and noise values are also analyzed.Simulation results indicate that PCRC has a sufficient robustness and its payoff presents a basically monotonic increasing tendency with the increment of noise.The superiority of PCRC becomes more obvious when the temptation coefficient becomes larger.Furthermore,a higher population preference for defection yields a more obvious advantage for PCRC.
                
                According to the philosophy of self-cultivation that "one should refine his personal virtue when in poverty, and help save the world when in success", a new type of evolutionary strategy, PoorCompetition-Rich-Cooperation(PCRC), is proposed. To discuss its superiority and inferiority, based on a multi-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, PCRC and other six kinds of strategies are played by using the roulette method in three different populations(a uniformly distributed population, a cooperation-preference population, a defection-preference population). The payoff characteristics for each strategy under different temptation coefficients and noise values are also analyzed. Simulation results indicate that PCRC has a sufficient robustness and its payoff presents a basically monotonic increasing tendency with the increment of noise. The superiority of PCRC becomes more obvious when the temptation coefficient becomes larger. Furthermore, a higher population preference for defection yields a more obvious advantage for PCRC.
    
    
    
    
            
                基金
                    Supported by the Anhui Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project(AHSKF2018D37).
            
    
    
    
                作者简介
Nenggang XIE,E-mail:xieng@ahut.edu.cn