摘要
A股市场长期以来普遍存在借"股份送转"之名配合解禁限售股高价套现的现象。研究发现:以限售股解禁比例和解禁市值对数衡量的解禁规模越大,公司进行股份送转的可能性及其比例就越高,并且投资者非理性对上述影响有显著的正向调节作用。随着政府部门针对"高送转"乱象开始严格监管,限售股解禁对公司送转行为的影响作用和投资者非理性对该影响的正向调节作用都明显减弱。这说明在当前A股市场存在大量非理性投资者的情况下,政府监管已经开始发挥"一石二鸟"的作用,既可以有效防止伪成长公司通过"高送转"配合解禁限售股高价套现,又能让广大投资者逐步改变其多年以来形成的"高送转"炒作陋习。
It is common for the listed companies of China’s A-Share Market to borrow the name of distributing stock dividends to help the expired lockups’shareholders sell their shares at higher price.We find that the larger the market value and the ratio of the share lockups’expiration,the higher the possibility and the paying ratio of the stock dividends.The investors’irrationality has statistically significant positive moderating effects on the above behavior.In the case of the spread of the large stock dividend in the A-share market,government began to strictly supervise this problem.We find that the influences of share lockups’expiration on their companies’stock dividend behavior and the positive moderating effects of investors’irrationality have been obviously weakened under the government supervision.The above results indicate that these government supervision measures have already begun to play the role of"kill two birds with one stone",which can not only effectively prevent the expired lockups’shareholders of pseudo growth companies from selling their expired lockup shares at high prices by distributing large stock dividends,but also help investors gradually change their bad habits of speculating on"the large stock dividend shares"formed over the years.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第8期91-103,共13页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71572195)的资助
关键词
限售股解禁
送转股份
政府监管
投资者非理性
调节效应
Expiration of Share Lockups
Stock Dividend
Government Supervision
Investors’ Irrationality
Moderating Effect
