控股股东股权质押与企业策略性环境信息披露——基于控制权转移风险的防范视角被引量：15

Shares Pledge of Controlling Shareholder and Corporate Strategic Environmental Information Disclosure——From the Perspective of the Risk of Losing Control Rights

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摘要股权质押为控股股东提供融资便利的同时,也加剧了其控制权转移风险。本文以环境信息披露为研究视角,探讨在控股股东股权质押的情境下,企业是否会策略性披露环境信息来防范控制权转移风险。研究发现,控股股东股权质押会促进企业策略性环境信息披露,表现为正面环境信息披露水平提升但质量不提升,负面环境信息披露水平和质量均下降。动因检验发现,企业策略性环境信息披露的动因在于稳定股价、政治寻租、投资获取。进一步分析发现,当新《环保法》实施、产权性质为民营、资金去向为自用时,控股股东股权质押对企业策略性环境信息披露的促进作用更显著。最后还发现,企业策略性环境信息披露不以企业环境绩效提升为基础,仅是一种环境信息管理。本文结论揭示了控股股东在股权质押情境下的环境管理行为,对于监管部门完善资本市场监管制度、投资者改善投资决策、企业优化环境管理均具有重要的参考价值。 While shares pledge of controlling shareholder bring financing facilities,there is still a risk of losing control rights.This study examines whether corporate disclose environmental information strategically to prevent the risk of control rights losing based on the controlling shareholders’shares pledge.We find that the pledge of controlling shareholder's shares promotes strategic environmental information disclosure,which is reflected by the increase in the level but not the quality of positive environmental information disclosure and the decrease in the level and quality of negative environmental information disclosure.In the motivation test,we find that share price stabilization,political rent seeking,and investment acquisition are three potential motivations of strategic environmental information disclosure.Moreover,we further find that the positive association between shareholders’shares pledge and corporate environmental information disclosure is more pronounced when the implementation of the new Environmental Protection Law,the firms are non-state owned,and the destination of funds is self-use.Finally,we find that corporate strategic environmental information disclosure is not based on the enhancement of environmental performance,and it is only a kind of environmental information management.Our findings reveal the environmental management behavior of controlling shareholders’shares pledge,which could be of important implications for regulators to improve the capital market regulatory system,investors to improve their investment decisions,and firms to optimize environmental management.

作者于连超董晋亭毕茜 Yu Lianchao

机构地区兰州大学管理学院重庆大学经济与工商管理学院西南大学经济管理学院

出处《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第12期60-76,共17页 Accounting Research

基金国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY060) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目(22lzujbkydx027)资助

关键词控股股东股权质押控制权转移风险环境信息披露稳定股价政治寻租投资获取 Controlling Shareholders'Share Pledging Risk of Losing Control Rights Environmental Information Disclosure Share Price Stability Political Rent-seeking Investment Acquisition