摘要
学术界认为高管薪酬是解决管理层和股东之间的代理问题的核心治理机制。本文以2010—2019年沪深A股非金融、保险上市公司为研究样本,实证研究了CEO能力、CEO权力与CEO薪酬的关系。研究结果表明:CEO能力越高,获得的CEO薪酬越多,CEO薪酬溢价是CEO能力的体现,符合管理层能力观。采用CEO能力的区域均值作为工具变量,解决了内生性问题,并通过了稳健性检验。进一步研究结果表明,与国有企业相比,非国有企业CEO能力对CEO薪酬的正向作用更加显著;与市场化程度高的地区相比,在市场化程度低的地区,CEO能力对CEO薪酬的正向影响更加显著,研究结论进一步丰富了高管薪酬和CEO能力的相关研究。
Academic circles believe that executive compensation is the core governance mechanism to solve the agency problem between management and shareholders.Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial and insurance listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as research samples,this paper empirically studies the relationship between CEO competence,power and CEO compensation.The results show that the more competent the CEO is,the more CEO compensation he gets.The CEO compensation premium is a reflection of the CEO’s competence,which is in line with managerial ability view.By using the regional mean of CEO competence as an instrumental variable,the endogeneity problem is solved and the robustness test is passed.Further research results show that compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises’CEO competence has a more significant positive effect on CEO compensation.Compared with regions with high degree of marketization,in regions with low degree of marketization,CEO competence has a more significant positive effect on CEO compensation.The research conclusion further enriches the related studies on executive compensation and CEO ability.
作者
赵振洋
李志欣
李可欣
Zhenyang Zhao;Zhixin Li;Kexin Li
出处
《会计与控制评论》
2021年第2期158-180,共23页
Review of Accounting and Control
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJC790067)
辽宁省教育厅青年科技人才“育苗”项目(LN2019Q65)
