摘要
政府采购市场是国内市场需求的重要组成部分,在优化营商环境、完善公共服务政策保障体系中具有关键作用。但由于政府采购中存在大量投标企业之间的合谋行为,导致财政资金使用效率大幅降低,严重扭曲了市场资源的配置机制。本文通过构建监管机构、投标企业演化博弈模型,分析政府采购过程中监管机构和投标企业决策的演化过程,并在多属性招标时各方均衡效用的基础上对各方主体的利益关系进行数值仿真。研究表明:监管机构在短期内趋向于严格监管企业合谋行为,但长期来看趋向于选择常态化监管策略。企业初始合谋意愿、合谋成本、监管效率对投标企业稳定于不合谋策略有影响。最后,本文为防止政府采购中企业之间的合谋行为提出建议。
The government procurement market is an important part of the domestic market demand and plays a key role in optimizing the business environment and improving the public service policy guarantee system.However,due to the collusion between a large number of bidding enterprises in government procurement,the using efciency of financial funds is greatly reduced,and the allocation mechanism of market resources is seriously distorted.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between regulators and bidders,analyzes the evolutionary process of decision-making between regulators and bidders in the process of government procurement,and numerically simulates the interest relationship of each party based on the balanced effectiveness of all parties in multi-attribute bidding.The research shows that regulators have the motivation to strictly regulate corporate collusive behavior in the short term,but tend to choose the normal regulatory strategy in the long term.The initial collusion willingness,collusion cost and supervision eficiency have influence on the stability of the non-collusion strategy.Finally,this paper puts forward some suggestions to prevent collusion between enterprises in govermment procurement.
作者
王乐
张容嘉
Le Wang;Rongjia Zhang(Vanke School of Public Health,Tsinghua University,Beijing,China;Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing,China)
出处
《南大商学评论》
2023年第2期61-79,共19页
Nanjing Business Review
关键词
政府采购
合谋
多属性招标
演化博弈
Government Procurement
Collusion
Multi-atribute Bidding
Evolutionary Game
作者简介
王乐(1994-),吉林四平人,清华大学万科公共卫生与健康学院,经济学博士,研究方向为产业组织理论、竞争政策与反垄断。E-mail:1504684290@163.com;通讯作者:张容嘉(1992-),辽宁阜新人,经济学博士,中国社会科学数量经济与技术经济研究所,助理研究员。研究方向为产业经济。E-mail:zxj0029@sina.com。
