摘要
学界一般认为胡塞尔的时间意识现象学旨在探讨意识的超越论建构。这个解读经常导致一种误解,即胡塞尔的现象学排除了日常意义下独立于意识之外的客观时间,乃至无法谈论一个不被经验的时间,比如远古时期等。这个解读导致胡塞尔现象学在法国当代哲学传统中多被诟病。本文试图证明,通过对客观时间的还原,胡塞尔的现象学并没有排除客观时间,而是企图获得时间客观性的根基。这个问题意识可以追溯至奥古斯丁的时间问题,即时间三相(过去、现在、将来)引致的悖论。在这个问题意识下,自然态度下把时间理解为一个客观的流淌过程恰好是可疑的。相反,胡塞尔的现象学能给予一个可理解(comprehensible)的回应:根据胡塞尔于《贝尔瑙手稿》的研究,时间的客观性来自于不同的刚性时间形式(Zeitform)或时间秩序(Zeitordnung)。时间三相只是对象被给予的时间模态(Zeitmodalitäten)。笔者认为这个通过现象学方法获得的客观时间理论,才更符合我们真正在日常生活乃至自然科学中使用的时间观。
It is believed that Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness aims at discovering the transcendental constitution of consciousness.This interpretation usually leads to the misunderstanding that Husserl's phenomenology has entirely refuted any possibility of conceiving time as external to our subjective experience,such as the objective time under the natural attitude or the ancient antiquity.This misunderstanding has led to many criticisms of Husserl,especially in contemporary French philosophy.In this paper,I aim to show that the phenomenological reduction of objective time does not entail the refutation of it;instead,it is a method towards reconstruction of the objectivity of time.This project refers back to Augustine's question of time which uncovers the paradoxical nature of the three timephases—past,present,and future.Under this premise,time conceived under the natural attitude as an objective flow is indeed problematic.Husserl's phenomenology can be regarded as a comprehensible response to this puzzle.According to Husserl's Bernau Manuscripts,objectivity of time is rendered by rigid temporal forms(Zeitform)and temporal orders(Zeitordnung).The three timephases are only timemodalities through which an object is given.I argue that this phenomenological analysis of the objectivity of time is coherent with how time is actually understood in daily life as well as in natural sciences.
出处
《清华西方哲学研究》
2021年第2期70-90,共21页
Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy
关键词
胡塞尔
现象学
时间
意识
客观性
观念
Husserl
Phenomenology
Time
Consciousness
Objectivity
Idea
