摘要
受制于传统公司治理框架的局限,中小股东权益保护问题一直未能得到较好的解决,而社交媒体的发展为中小股东在产业政策相关并购决策中的“发声”提供了重要渠道。文章利用沪深交易所互动易(e互动)数据,考察中小股东在社交媒体的产业政策信息反馈对公司并购产业政策支持项目偏好的影响。研究发现,中小股东社交媒体的产业政策信息反馈显著增加了企业并购产业政策支持项目的比重,该影响在投资者保护水平低、媒体素养低以及公司治理水平低的企业中更加显著。机制检验表明,中小股东在社交媒体的“发声”不仅会加大企业的股票价格波动,也会增强企业在并购时选择产业政策支持项目的偏好。文章为监管部门提高企业并购重组质量、落实中小股东权益保护政策提供借鉴。
For a long time,M&A is an important means and strategy for many firms to achieve leapfrog development,and it is a topic of high attention in the capital market.Because information asymmetry in M&A can not be fundamentally eliminated,some M&A fails to achieve financial synergies,especially in the context that the first serious type of agency problems still exists in Chinese capital market firms,the second type of agency problems seriously damages the interests of a large number of minority shareholders,which is particularly prominent in the M&A decision-making of industrial-policy supported projects.Limited by the traditional corporate governance framework,the protection of rights and interests of minority shareholders has not been well solved.The development of social media provides an important channel for minority shareholders to voice in industrial-policy-related M&A decision-making.Based on the background of China’s industrial policy and the e-interactive data of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2020,this paper investigates the impact of industrial-policy information feedback of minority shareholders on corporate M&A industrial-policy supported project preference.It is found that the feedback of industrial-policy information from minority shareholders on social media will significantly increase the proportion(number)of industrial-policy supported projects for M&A,and this effect is more significant in firms with low investor protection level,low media literacy level and low corporate governance level.The mechanism test shows that the feedback of industrial-policy information from minority shareholders on social media platforms will not only increase the stock price volatility of firms,but also increase the traditional media reports of firms,thus enhancing the preference of firms to choose industrial-policy supported projects during M&A.Therefore,on the one hand,based on the perspective of minority shareholders taking the initiative to safeguard their own rights and interests,this paper expands the literature on factors affecting M&A decision-making,and obtains empirical evidence that minority shareholders’social media“voice”affects M&A preference;on the other hand,it reveals that industrial policy has a significant impact on the decision-making behavior of minority shareholders,enriching the literature on the feedback of minority shareholders on the effect of industrial policy.In addition,this paper is helpful to deepen the understanding of the impact of macro-industrial policy on micro-firm governance behaviors,providing reference for the regulatory authority to improve the quality of M&A and reorganization and implement policies on protecting the rights and interests of minority shareholders.
作者
罗劲博
窦超
Luo Jingbo;Dou Chao(School of Management,Lanzhou University,GanSu Lanzhou 730000,China;School of Business,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期123-137,共15页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金“高管的‘协会’任职与企业并购决策:影响、机理与经济后果”(71762014)
关键词
中小股东
社交媒体
产业政策
企业并购
minority shareholders
social media
industrial policy
M&A
作者简介
罗劲博(1973—),男,陕西宝鸡人,兰州大学管理学院会计系教授、博士生导师;窦超(1990—),男,湖南郴州人,中央财经大学商学院副教授。
