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国家审计与央企控股上市公司创新质量 被引量:16

The Impact of Government Audit on the Innovation Quality of Listed Companies Controlled by Central SOEs
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摘要 我国正由专利申请大国向专利质量强国转变,如何发挥国家审计的监督和激励作用促进企业高质量创新已成为新时代的一个重要课题。本文以2010-2020年央企控股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了国家审计对央企控股上市公司创新质量的提升作用及机制。研究结果表明:国家审计实施后,央企控股上市公司的创新质量显著提升;进一步的机制检验与分析发现,首先,国家审计能够更有效地提升政府研发补贴水平更高、非效率投资水平更高企业的创新质量,表明国家审计能够发挥提升创新质量的监督效应;其次,国家审计能够更有效地提升管理层薪酬激励水平更高、股权激励水平更低企业的创新质量,表明国家审计能够发挥提升创新质量的激励效应。总体而言,本文结论为更加深刻认识国家审计激励创新的监督效应提供了经验证据,对完善国家经济治理现代化与高质量创新发展理论具有一定的启示。 China is developing from a large country of patent application to a strong country of patent quality,how government audit and supervision can play a better role in promoting high-quality development of enterprises becomes an important topic in the new era.Taking the listed companies controlled by central SOEs as the research sample,this paper empirically tests the impact of government audit on the innovation quality of listed companies controlled by central SOEs.The results show that with the implementation of government audit,the innovation quality of listed companies controlled by central SOEs improved significantly.Government audit could improve more effectively the innovation quality of enterprises with higher government R&D subsidies and higher inefficiency investment levels,indicating that government audit could play a supervisory role;government audit could improve more effectively the innovation quality of enterprises with higher management salary incentive level and lower equity incentive level,revealing that government audit could exert an incentive effect.In sum,this paper provides empirical evidence for a deeper understanding of the supervisory and incentive role of government audit in improving the innovation quality of SOEs,and shows some enlightenments for improving the theory of the modernization of national economic governance and high-quality innovation and development.
作者 郑国洪 肖忠意 陈海涛 Zheng Guohong;Xiao Zhongyi;Chen Haitao
出处 《审计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第5期25-36,共12页 Auditing Research
基金 国家社科基金一般项目(项目批准号:18XGL011)的资助
关键词 国家审计 创新质量 非效率投资 管理层短视 governmnet audit innovation quality inefficient investment management myopia
作者简介 郑国洪,西南政法大学商学院、西南政法大学审计与法治研究中心,邮政编码:401120,电子信箱:zhengguohong@swupl.edu.cn;肖忠意,西南政法大学经济学院,邮政编码:401120,电子信箱:xiaozhongyi@swupl.edu.cn;陈海涛,西南政法大学经济学院,邮政编码:401120,电子信箱:chenhaitao_swupl@outlook.com。
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