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基于两型博弈的双边链路形成策略优化研究 被引量:5

Research on Strategy Optimization of Bilateral Link Formation Based on Biform Games
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摘要 文章主要利用非合作-合作两型博弈方法研究网络安全访问链路形成策略优化问题.首先,在第一阶段(非合作博弈),构建网络中所有局中人(即节点)的策略组合,形成第二阶段(合作博弈)的竞争局势.其次,在第二阶段(合作博弈),利用Shapley值求解第一阶段各个策略局势下每个合作博弈的局中人分配值,从而构建了第一阶段的非合作博弈,进而求解其纯策略纳什均衡解,据此求得基于两型博弈的整个双边链路形成的最优策略选择.最后,通过数值实例验证了所建模型与方法的有效性、可应用性,可为网络安全访问链接、社会网络等优化设计问题提供新的解决途径. This paper mainly studies the problem of network security access link formation strategy optimization by using the biform game(also known as non-cooperative-cooperative game)method.Firstly,in the first phase(non-cooperative game),the strategy combinations of all players(i.e.,nodes)in the network are constructed to form competitive situations in the second phase(cooperative game).Secondly,in the second stage(cooperative game),the Shapley value is used to solve players’distribution values of each cooperative game under each strategy situation in the first stage.Thus,we construct the first-stage non-cooperative game and then obtain the pure Nash equilibrium strategies.Accordingly,the Nash equilibrium solutions are the optimal strategy choices for the entire bilateral link formation based on the biform game.Finally,a numerical example is used to verify the validity and applicability of the built models and methods,which can provide a new solution to optimization design problems such as network security access links and social networks.
作者 梁开荣 李登峰 余高锋 LIANG Kairong;LI Dengfeng;YU Gaofeng(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108;School of Managmnt and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu611731)
出处 《系统科学与数学》 CSCD 北大核心 2020年第9期1550-1563,共14页 Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金 国家自然基金(71231003,71572040)项目 福建省社会科学规划资助项目(FJ2018B076,FJ2019B139) 福建省自然科学基金面上项目(2018J01810)资助课题
关键词 双边链路 非合作博弈 合作博弈 非合作-合作两型博弈 SHAPLEY值 Bilateral link non-cooperative game cooperative game biform game Shapley value
作者简介 通信作者:李登峰,Email:lidengfeng@uestc.edu.cn.
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