摘要
提高官员"不想腐"的内在自觉性,是治理官员腐败最有效的机制。在理论方面,本文尝试将社会信任引入一般均衡模型分析框架,探究社会信任对官员腐败的作用机理。研究发现,社会信任能够压缩官员"想"腐败的收益空间,进而抑制官员腐败。在实证方面,利用中国2000~2016年省级层面数据进行实证检验。经验结果显示,社会信任能够显著抑制官员腐败,但表现出较强的区域差异性,在市场化水平、法律保护水平较高的地区,社会信任对官员腐败具有显著抑制作用。进一步地,基于中介效应检验方法,探究了社会信任对官员腐败的作用渠道,研究发现,居民收入水平、失业率在社会信任和官员腐败之间发挥着重要的中介作用,社会信任可以通过提高居民收入水平、降低失业率两种渠道抑制官员腐败。基于上述结论,本文认为完善社会信任体系建设,提高社会信任水平,能够促使官员形成"不想腐"的内在自觉,具有重要实践价值。
Improving the internal consciousness of officials"not wanting to corruption"is the most effective mechanism for managing official corruption.In theory,this paper attempts to introduce social trust into general equilibrium model analysis framework,and explore the mechanism of social trust on official corruption.The study found that social trust can reduce the income space of official corruption and form an effective mechanism to suppress official corruption.In empirical analysis,the empirical test is conducted using China’s provincial-level data from 2000 to2016;The empirical test results show that social trust can significantly suppress official corruption,but it shows strong regional differences.In areas with high level of marketization and high level of legal protection,social trust has a significant inhibitory effect on official corruption.Further,based on the mediation effect test method,the paper explored the channels through which social trust plays a role in official corruption,and found that the income level and unemployment rate of residents play an important mediation role between social trust and official corruption.Social trust can suppress official corruption by increasing the income level of residents and reducing unemployment rate.Based on the above conclusions,this paper considers that improving the construction of social trust system and improving the level of social trust can prompt officials to form an internal consciousness of"not wanting to corruption"and have important practical value.
作者
李双建
李俊青
陈钢
LI Shuangjian;LI Junqing;CHEN Gang(Institute for Advanced Research,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,200433;School of Economics,Nankai University,300071;School of Business Administration,Henan University of Economics and Law,450046)
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2019年第3期48-87,共40页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金应急项目“宏观经济政策组合与系统性金融风险的防范与化解——基于大型准结构一般均衡模型的模拟分析”(71850002)
国家自然科学基金青年基金项目“基于治理特殊性的企业基金会自主性研究”(71802072)
中国博士后基金面上项目(2018M641971)
关键词
社会信任
官员腐败
中介作用
Social Trust
Official Corruption
Mediation Role
作者简介
李双建,上海财经大学高等研究院博士后,经济学博士;李俊青,南开大学经济学院教授,经济学博士,博士生导师;通讯作者:陈钢,河南财经政法大学工商管理学院讲师,管理学博士,地址:河南省郑州市金水东路180号河南财经政法大学工商管理学院(450046),E-mail:chenga-ng20061988@126.com。
