摘要
新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情发生以来,许多消费者会选择通过网络平台采购食品,同样地,食品制造企业也会越来越多地通过网络平台进行销售。网络平台不仅能够利用在线评论通过大数据分析为制造商提供更多更精准的市场需求信息,同时也有能力担负起对食品安全风险进行管控的责任。本文首先构建了基于食品制造企业与网络平台企业的两层供应链模型,其次通过斯塔克伯格博弈,分析当食品制造企业和网络平台分别占据市场主导地位时的两种供应链情境,得到制造商最优产品质量和网络平台最优食品监管水平的策略。最后,通过一系列的仿真实验得到一些管理启示:第一,食品制造企业有寻找监管水平低的网络平台进行销售的动机,但是食品制造企业想要获得最大收益还是需要提升"内功",老老实实做好产品质量。第二,当食品制造企业占主导地位时,本身产品质量过硬、声誉好的制造商会拿走网络平台的大多数利润,而当网络平台占主导地位时,网络平台也会有选择中小型食品加工企业为其生产自有品牌产品的可能。第三,网络平台能够利用产品在线评价信息、用户画像、基于地理信息的推送服务等大数据分析手段了解消费市场需求,对食品安全风险进行有效管控,最终能够为其自身和制造商带来双赢。
Since the outbreak of COVID 19,many consumers choosed to purchase food through online platforms,and the food manufacturers also increasingly sold food through online platforms.The network platform can not only provide more and more accurate market demands for manufacturers through online comments and big data analysis,but also take on the responsibility of controlling food safety risks.Based on the two-tier market structure model of food manufacturer and network platform,this paper analyzes the strategies of the optimal product quality of manufacturer and the optimal food safety supervision level of the network platform by the Stackelberg game.In addition,through a series of simulation experiments,we get some management enlightenment as follows:Firstly,food manufacturers have the motivation to find a network platform with low supervision level for sales,which is convenient for manufacturers to take the initiative in the supply chain in order to obtain more profits,but manufacturers still need to improve product quality if they want to obtain the maximum profits.Secondly,when the food manufacturing enterprises are dominant,the manufacturers with excellent product quality and good reputation will take most of the profits of the online platform,but when the online platform is dominant,the online platform will also choose small and medium-sized food processing enterprises to produce their own brand products.Thirdly,the network platform can better understand the consumer market demand by big data analysis such as online product evaluation information,user portrait and push service based on geographic information,which can effectively control the food safety risks and ultimately bring a win-win situation for her and the food manufacturer.
作者
王嘉馨
傅啸
韩广华
Wang Jiaxin;Fu Xiao;Han Guanghua
出处
《中国食品安全治理评论》
2020年第1期198-221,260-261,共26页
China Food Safety Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“佣金代理情况下零售商基于信任的订货决策和风险控制研究”(项目编号:71802065)的阶段性研究成果
作者简介
王嘉馨,中国美术学院中国画与书法艺术学院助理研究员,研究方向为公共关系、媒介研究;傅啸,杭州电子科技大学浙江省信息化发展研究院副教授,研究方向为供应链企业信任关系、食品安全供应链;韩广华,上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院副教授,研究方向为食品安全、风险治理。
