摘要
康德对说谎有悖常理的态度经常被视为其伦理学严峻主义与不切实际的表现。不说谎亦即真诚的义务在康德理论中的复杂性在于,它既被看作对自身的义务,又被看作对他人的义务;既被归入法权义务,又被视为伦理(德性)义务。本文细致考察了有关康德说谎问题的经典和前沿解释,并在与自我义务的关联中解释了康德何以对说谎毫不容情的态度,指出这可以部分地归因于康德没有区分第二和第一序列的自我义务。这一区分也将有助于我们理解康德何以在其后期德性论中赋予自我义务以一种奠基意义上的优先性。文章进一步指出,唯有将说谎归结为道德自欺,并将其与根本恶相联结,说谎才可能被看作恶的根源,而真诚的义务或者说对自身道德意念的认识也才能被视为自我义务的第一原则。
Kant’s unconventional attitude towards lying is often regarded as a manifestation of his ethical rigorism and impracticality.The complexity of the problem of lying in Kant’s philosophy is attributable to the fact that truth-telling is regarded as both a duty to oneself and a duty to others,in other words,it is both of the category of juridical and of the category of ethical duties.This essay proposes to explain Kant’s intolerant attitude towards lying in terms of his failure to distinguish between second-and first-order duties to oneself.Doing so also helps us to understand why Kant gave self-duty a foundational priority in his philosophy of virtue.The essay further argues that only when lying is conflated with moral self-deception,itself connected with Kant’s notion of radical evil,can it be regarded as the most serious violation of our humanity,and even as the source of all moral evils.
出处
《哲学动态》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期78-86,129,共10页
Philosophical Trends
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“康德的自由观及其现象学诠释”(18BZX091)的阶段性成果
