本文基于Grossman and Helpman(1984)"保护待售"模型的分析框架,运用联立方程组模型,对人民币汇率和关税议案投票表决结果进行实证分析,以揭示利益集团对国会投票的作用机制。分析表明,美国国会对华经贸政策的制定是政府权力...本文基于Grossman and Helpman(1984)"保护待售"模型的分析框架,运用联立方程组模型,对人民币汇率和关税议案投票表决结果进行实证分析,以揭示利益集团对国会投票的作用机制。分析表明,美国国会对华经贸政策的制定是政府权力机关与利益集团意志共同作用的结果,利益集团的政治捐资显著影响议员投票行为,进而影响美国对华经贸政策的制定。此外,美国对华经济贸易政策的决定机制没有显著受到议员所属选区经济特征的影响,侧面暗示了国会议员在贸易政策制定时没有较多关注本选区的经济状况,而是较多地从政治立场出发以及出于吸引更多政治捐资的需要。展开更多
We test the effect of China’s capital account openness on the fragility of bank system.We find capital account openness existing negative effect on bank system’s fragility,which obviously differ from former theory a...We test the effect of China’s capital account openness on the fragility of bank system.We find capital account openness existing negative effect on bank system’s fragility,which obviously differ from former theory and empirical research.The reasons can attribute to the gradual openness and preference to FDI.which make China avoid“over-borrowing syndrome”which is common in development countries after the openness of capital account.展开更多
文摘本文基于Grossman and Helpman(1984)"保护待售"模型的分析框架,运用联立方程组模型,对人民币汇率和关税议案投票表决结果进行实证分析,以揭示利益集团对国会投票的作用机制。分析表明,美国国会对华经贸政策的制定是政府权力机关与利益集团意志共同作用的结果,利益集团的政治捐资显著影响议员投票行为,进而影响美国对华经贸政策的制定。此外,美国对华经济贸易政策的决定机制没有显著受到议员所属选区经济特征的影响,侧面暗示了国会议员在贸易政策制定时没有较多关注本选区的经济状况,而是较多地从政治立场出发以及出于吸引更多政治捐资的需要。
文摘We test the effect of China’s capital account openness on the fragility of bank system.We find capital account openness existing negative effect on bank system’s fragility,which obviously differ from former theory and empirical research.The reasons can attribute to the gradual openness and preference to FDI.which make China avoid“over-borrowing syndrome”which is common in development countries after the openness of capital account.
