We study the influence of conformity on the evolution of cooperative behavior in games under the learning method of sampling on networks.A strategy update rule based on sampling is introduced into the stag hunt game,w...We study the influence of conformity on the evolution of cooperative behavior in games under the learning method of sampling on networks.A strategy update rule based on sampling is introduced into the stag hunt game,where agents draw samples from their neighbors and then update their strategies based on conformity or inference according to the situation in the sample.Based on these assumptions,we present the state transition equations in the dynamic evolution of population cooperation,conduct simulation analysis on lattice networks and scale-free networks,and discuss how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation and how cooperation evolves under different levels of conformity in the network.Our simulation results show that blindly imitating the strategies of neighbors does not necessarily lead to rapid consensus in the population.Instead,rational inference through samples can better promote the evolution of the same strategy among all agents in the population.Moreover,the simulation results also show that a smaller sample size cannot reflect the true situation of the neighbors,which has a large randomness,and the size of the benefits obtained in cooperation determines the direction of the entire population towards cooperation or defection.This work incorporates the conforming behavior of agents into the game,uses the method of sampling for strategy updates and enriches the theory of evolutionary games with a more realistic significance.展开更多
This paper proposed a new libration decoupling analytical speed function(LD-ASF)in lieu of the classic analytical speed function to control the climber's speed along a partial space elevator to improve libration s...This paper proposed a new libration decoupling analytical speed function(LD-ASF)in lieu of the classic analytical speed function to control the climber's speed along a partial space elevator to improve libration stability in cargo transportation.The LD-ASF is further optimized for payload transportation efficiency by a novel coordinate game theory to balance competing control objectives among payload transport speed,stable end body's libration,and overall control input via model predictive control.The transfer period is divided into several sections to reduce computational burden.The validity and efficacy of the proposed LD-ASF and coordinate game-based model predictive control are demonstrated by computer simulation.Numerical results reveal that the optimized LD-ASF results in higher transportation speed,stable end body's libration,lower thrust fuel consumption,and more flexible optimization space than the classic analytical speed function.展开更多
In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the g...In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation ofcostly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society,specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruisticpunishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numericalcalculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages thantraditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads toa higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.展开更多
In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers in...In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.展开更多
This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the ...This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service （QoS） standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio （S/NR） and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium （NE） in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.展开更多
In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters...In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.展开更多
This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,coo...This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.展开更多
Constructing a cross-border power energy system with multiagent power energy as an alliance is important for studying cross-border power-trading markets.This study considers multiple neighboring countries in the form ...Constructing a cross-border power energy system with multiagent power energy as an alliance is important for studying cross-border power-trading markets.This study considers multiple neighboring countries in the form of alliances,introduces neighboring countries’exchange rates into the cross-border multi-agent power-trading market and proposes a method to study each agent’s dynamic decision-making behavior based on evolutionary game theory.To this end,this study uses three national agents as examples,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model,and analyzes the evolution process of the decision-making behavior of each agent member state under the initial willingness value,cost of payment,and additional revenue of the alliance.This research helps realize cross-border energy operations so that the transaction agent can achieve greater trade profits and provides a theoretical basis for cooperation and stability between multiple agents.展开更多
Purpose:The collaboration relationships between innovation actors at a geographic level may be considered as grouping two separate layers,the domestic and the foreign.At the level of each layer,the relationships and t...Purpose:The collaboration relationships between innovation actors at a geographic level may be considered as grouping two separate layers,the domestic and the foreign.At the level of each layer,the relationships and the actors involved constitute a Triple Helix game.The paper distinguished three levels of analysis:the global grouping together all actors,the domestic grouping together domestic actors,and the foreign related to only actors from partner countries.Design/methodology/approach:Bibliographic records data from the Web of Science for South Korea and West Africa breakdown per innovation actors and distinguishing domestic and international collaboration are analyzed with game theory.The core,the Shapley value,and the nucleolus are computed at the three levels to measure the synergy between actors.Findings:The synergy operates more in South Korea than in West Africa;the government is more present in West Africa than in South Korea;domestic actors create more synergy in South Korea,but foreign more in West Africa;South Korea can consume all the foreign synergy,which is not the case of West Africa.Research limitations:Research data are limited to publication records;techniques and methods used may be extended to other research outputs.Practical implications:West African governments should increase their investment in science,technology,and innovation to benefit more from the synergy their innovation actors contributed at the foreign level.However,the results of the current study may not be sufficient to prove that greater investment will yield benefits from foreign synergies.Originality/value:This paper uses game theory to assess innovation systems by computing the contribution of foreign actors to knowledge production at an area level.It proposes an indicator to this end.展开更多
Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore ...Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.展开更多
In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different...In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player’s learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player’s strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner’s dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In contrast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.展开更多
The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes coope...The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.展开更多
Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing h...Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.展开更多
This paper presents a mode-switching collaborative defense strategy for spacecraft pursuit-evasiondefense scenarios.In these scenarios,the pursuer tries to avoid the defender while capturing the evader,while the evade...This paper presents a mode-switching collaborative defense strategy for spacecraft pursuit-evasiondefense scenarios.In these scenarios,the pursuer tries to avoid the defender while capturing the evader,while the evader and defender form an alliance to prevent the pursuer from achieving its goal.First,the behavioral modes of the pursuer,including attack and avoidance modes,were established using differential game theory.These modes are then recognized by an interactive multiple model-matching algorithm(IMM),that uses several smooth variable structure filters to match the modes of the pursuer and update their probabilities in real time.Based on the linear-quadratic optimization theory,combined with the results of strategy identification,a two-way cooperative optimal strategy for the defender and evader is proposed,where the evader aids the defender to intercept the pursuer by performing luring maneuvers.Simulation results show that the interactive multi-model algorithm based on several smooth variable structure filters perform well in the strategy identification of the pursuer,and the cooperative defense strategy based on strategy identification has good interception performance when facing pursuers,who are able to flexibly adjust their game objectives.展开更多
Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic kno...Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.展开更多
A systematic and effective optimization is proposed for the design of a three-dimensional （3-D） vehicle suspension model with eight degrees of freedom （DOF）, including vertical seat motion, vehicle suspension, pit...A systematic and effective optimization is proposed for the design of a three-dimensional （3-D） vehicle suspension model with eight degrees of freedom （DOF）, including vertical seat motion, vehicle suspension, pitching and rolling motions, and vertical wheel motions using the evolutionary game theory. A new design of the passive suspension is aided by game theory to attain the best compromise between ride quality and suspension deflections. Extensive simulations are performed on three type road surface models A, B, C pavement grades based on the guidelines provided by ISO-2631 with the Matlab/Simulink environment. The preliminary results show that, when the passive suspension is optimized via the proposed approach, a substantial improvement in the vertical ride quality is obtained while keeping the suspension deflections within their allowable clearance when the vehicle moves at a constant velocity v=20 m/s, and the comfort performance of a suspension seat can be enhanced by 20%-30%.展开更多
Games and songs can bring a lot of pleasure to children. They are useful tools in children's language learning. As English teachers, we should know how to make full use of them to stimulate children's interest...Games and songs can bring a lot of pleasure to children. They are useful tools in children's language learning. As English teachers, we should know how to make full use of them to stimulate children's interest and promote their learning. In this essay, I will take one primary English lesson as an example to demonstrate my point. First I am going to talk about the advantages of using a game and a song, and then analyze the teaching or learning context and the activities in the lesson. At last I am going to focus on how and why to use the game and the song in the classroom. In a word, I am going to justify my choice and use of a game and a song in a revision lesson.展开更多
Game theory can be applied to the air combat decision-making problem of multiple unmanned combat air vehicles(UCAVs).However,it is difficult to have satisfactory decision-making results completely relying on air comba...Game theory can be applied to the air combat decision-making problem of multiple unmanned combat air vehicles(UCAVs).However,it is difficult to have satisfactory decision-making results completely relying on air combat situation information,because there is a lot of time-sensitive information in a complex air combat environment.In this paper,a constraint strategy game approach is developed to generate intelligent decision-making for multiple UCAVs in complex air combat environment with air combat situation information and time-sensitive information.Initially,a constraint strategy game is employed to model attack-defense decision-making problem in complex air combat environment.Then,an algorithm is proposed for solving the constraint strategy game based on linear programming and linear inequality(CSG-LL).Finally,an example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.展开更多
One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the envir...One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.展开更多
A multi-objective evolutionary optimization method (combining genetic algorithms(GAs)and game theory(GT))is presented for high lift multi-airfoil systems in aerospace engineering.Due to large dimension global op-timiz...A multi-objective evolutionary optimization method (combining genetic algorithms(GAs)and game theory(GT))is presented for high lift multi-airfoil systems in aerospace engineering.Due to large dimension global op-timization problems and the increasing importance of low cost distributed parallel environments,it is a natural idea to replace a globar optimization by decentralized local sub-optimizations using GT which introduces the notion of games associated to an optimization problem.The GT/GAs combined optimization method is used for recon-struction and optimization problems by high lift multi-air-foil desing.Numerical results are favorably compared with single global GAs.The method shows teh promising robustness and efficient parallel properties of coupled GAs with different game scenarios for future advanced multi-disciplinary aerospace techmologies.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.72031009)the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.20&ZD058)。
文摘We study the influence of conformity on the evolution of cooperative behavior in games under the learning method of sampling on networks.A strategy update rule based on sampling is introduced into the stag hunt game,where agents draw samples from their neighbors and then update their strategies based on conformity or inference according to the situation in the sample.Based on these assumptions,we present the state transition equations in the dynamic evolution of population cooperation,conduct simulation analysis on lattice networks and scale-free networks,and discuss how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation and how cooperation evolves under different levels of conformity in the network.Our simulation results show that blindly imitating the strategies of neighbors does not necessarily lead to rapid consensus in the population.Instead,rational inference through samples can better promote the evolution of the same strategy among all agents in the population.Moreover,the simulation results also show that a smaller sample size cannot reflect the true situation of the neighbors,which has a large randomness,and the size of the benefits obtained in cooperation determines the direction of the entire population towards cooperation or defection.This work incorporates the conforming behavior of agents into the game,uses the method of sampling for strategy updates and enriches the theory of evolutionary games with a more realistic significance.
基金funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(12102487)Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation of Guangdong Province,China(2023A1515012339)+1 种基金Shenzhen Science and Technology Program(ZDSYS20210623091808026)the Discovery Grant(RGPIN-2024-06290)of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada。
文摘This paper proposed a new libration decoupling analytical speed function(LD-ASF)in lieu of the classic analytical speed function to control the climber's speed along a partial space elevator to improve libration stability in cargo transportation.The LD-ASF is further optimized for payload transportation efficiency by a novel coordinate game theory to balance competing control objectives among payload transport speed,stable end body's libration,and overall control input via model predictive control.The transfer period is divided into several sections to reduce computational burden.The validity and efficacy of the proposed LD-ASF and coordinate game-based model predictive control are demonstrated by computer simulation.Numerical results reveal that the optimized LD-ASF results in higher transportation speed,stable end body's libration,lower thrust fuel consumption,and more flexible optimization space than the classic analytical speed function.
基金the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China(Grant No.71961003).
文摘In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individualcooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation ofcostly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society,specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruisticpunishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numericalcalculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages thantraditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads toa higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.
基金the Open Foundation of Key Lab-oratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61172073the Open Research Fund of National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory,Southeast University under Grant No.2012D19+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,Beijing Jiaotong University under Grant No.2013JBZ01the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of Ministry of Education of China under Grant No.NCET-12-0766
文摘This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service （QoS） standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio （S/NR） and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium （NE） in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 10672081）.
文摘In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
基金Project supported by the Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.
基金National Key R&D Program of China(Grant No.2022YFB2703500)National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.52277104)+2 种基金National Key R&D Program of Yunnan Province(202303AC100003)Applied Basic Research Foundation of Yunnan Province (202301AT070455, 202101AT070080)Revitalizing Talent Support Program of Yunnan Province (KKRD202204024).
文摘Constructing a cross-border power energy system with multiagent power energy as an alliance is important for studying cross-border power-trading markets.This study considers multiple neighboring countries in the form of alliances,introduces neighboring countries’exchange rates into the cross-border multi-agent power-trading market and proposes a method to study each agent’s dynamic decision-making behavior based on evolutionary game theory.To this end,this study uses three national agents as examples,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model,and analyzes the evolution process of the decision-making behavior of each agent member state under the initial willingness value,cost of payment,and additional revenue of the alliance.This research helps realize cross-border energy operations so that the transaction agent can achieve greater trade profits and provides a theoretical basis for cooperation and stability between multiple agents.
文摘Purpose:The collaboration relationships between innovation actors at a geographic level may be considered as grouping two separate layers,the domestic and the foreign.At the level of each layer,the relationships and the actors involved constitute a Triple Helix game.The paper distinguished three levels of analysis:the global grouping together all actors,the domestic grouping together domestic actors,and the foreign related to only actors from partner countries.Design/methodology/approach:Bibliographic records data from the Web of Science for South Korea and West Africa breakdown per innovation actors and distinguishing domestic and international collaboration are analyzed with game theory.The core,the Shapley value,and the nucleolus are computed at the three levels to measure the synergy between actors.Findings:The synergy operates more in South Korea than in West Africa;the government is more present in West Africa than in South Korea;domestic actors create more synergy in South Korea,but foreign more in West Africa;South Korea can consume all the foreign synergy,which is not the case of West Africa.Research limitations:Research data are limited to publication records;techniques and methods used may be extended to other research outputs.Practical implications:West African governments should increase their investment in science,technology,and innovation to benefit more from the synergy their innovation actors contributed at the foreign level.However,the results of the current study may not be sufficient to prove that greater investment will yield benefits from foreign synergies.Originality/value:This paper uses game theory to assess innovation systems by computing the contribution of foreign actors to knowledge production at an area level.It proposes an indicator to this end.
基金the financial support from the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China(2022M720131)Spring Sunshine Collaborative Research Project of the Ministry of Education(202201660)+3 种基金Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation(22JR5RA542)General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation(2022YB014)National Natural Science Foundation of China(72034003,72243006,and 71874074)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2023lzdxjbkyzx008,lzujbky-2021-sp72)。
文摘Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.
基金Project supported by the Doctoral Foundation Project of Guizhou University(Grant No.(2019)49)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71961003)the Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province(Grant No.7223)。
文摘In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player’s learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player’s strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner’s dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In contrast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871171,71871173,and 71701076)
文摘The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61673096 and 62076057)the Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education of China(Grant No.16YJC630118)the Project of Promoting Talents in Liaoning Province,China(Grant No.XLYC1807033)。
文摘Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.
基金the Science and Technology Department,Heilongjiang Province under Grant Agreement No JJ2022LH0315。
文摘This paper presents a mode-switching collaborative defense strategy for spacecraft pursuit-evasiondefense scenarios.In these scenarios,the pursuer tries to avoid the defender while capturing the evader,while the evader and defender form an alliance to prevent the pursuer from achieving its goal.First,the behavioral modes of the pursuer,including attack and avoidance modes,were established using differential game theory.These modes are then recognized by an interactive multiple model-matching algorithm(IMM),that uses several smooth variable structure filters to match the modes of the pursuer and update their probabilities in real time.Based on the linear-quadratic optimization theory,combined with the results of strategy identification,a two-way cooperative optimal strategy for the defender and evader is proposed,where the evader aids the defender to intercept the pursuer by performing luring maneuvers.Simulation results show that the interactive multi-model algorithm based on several smooth variable structure filters perform well in the strategy identification of the pursuer,and the cooperative defense strategy based on strategy identification has good interception performance when facing pursuers,who are able to flexibly adjust their game objectives.
文摘Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.
基金Supported by Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University (070003)the Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Province (070414154)~~
文摘A systematic and effective optimization is proposed for the design of a three-dimensional （3-D） vehicle suspension model with eight degrees of freedom （DOF）, including vertical seat motion, vehicle suspension, pitching and rolling motions, and vertical wheel motions using the evolutionary game theory. A new design of the passive suspension is aided by game theory to attain the best compromise between ride quality and suspension deflections. Extensive simulations are performed on three type road surface models A, B, C pavement grades based on the guidelines provided by ISO-2631 with the Matlab/Simulink environment. The preliminary results show that, when the passive suspension is optimized via the proposed approach, a substantial improvement in the vertical ride quality is obtained while keeping the suspension deflections within their allowable clearance when the vehicle moves at a constant velocity v=20 m/s, and the comfort performance of a suspension seat can be enhanced by 20%-30%.
文摘Games and songs can bring a lot of pleasure to children. They are useful tools in children's language learning. As English teachers, we should know how to make full use of them to stimulate children's interest and promote their learning. In this essay, I will take one primary English lesson as an example to demonstrate my point. First I am going to talk about the advantages of using a game and a song, and then analyze the teaching or learning context and the activities in the lesson. At last I am going to focus on how and why to use the game and the song in the classroom. In a word, I am going to justify my choice and use of a game and a song in a revision lesson.
基金supported by Major Projects for Science and Technology Innovation 2030(Grant No.2018AA0100800)Equipment Pre-research Foundation of Laboratory(Grant No.61425040104)in part by Jiangsu Province“333”project under Grant BRA2019051.
文摘Game theory can be applied to the air combat decision-making problem of multiple unmanned combat air vehicles(UCAVs).However,it is difficult to have satisfactory decision-making results completely relying on air combat situation information,because there is a lot of time-sensitive information in a complex air combat environment.In this paper,a constraint strategy game approach is developed to generate intelligent decision-making for multiple UCAVs in complex air combat environment with air combat situation information and time-sensitive information.Initially,a constraint strategy game is employed to model attack-defense decision-making problem in complex air combat environment.Then,an algorithm is proposed for solving the constraint strategy game based on linear programming and linear inequality(CSG-LL).Finally,an example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871171,71871173,and 71832010)
文摘One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.
文摘A multi-objective evolutionary optimization method (combining genetic algorithms(GAs)and game theory(GT))is presented for high lift multi-airfoil systems in aerospace engineering.Due to large dimension global op-timization problems and the increasing importance of low cost distributed parallel environments,it is a natural idea to replace a globar optimization by decentralized local sub-optimizations using GT which introduces the notion of games associated to an optimization problem.The GT/GAs combined optimization method is used for recon-struction and optimization problems by high lift multi-air-foil desing.Numerical results are favorably compared with single global GAs.The method shows teh promising robustness and efficient parallel properties of coupled GAs with different game scenarios for future advanced multi-disciplinary aerospace techmologies.
