We study the influence of conformity on the evolution of cooperative behavior in games under the learning method of sampling on networks.A strategy update rule based on sampling is introduced into the stag hunt game,w...We study the influence of conformity on the evolution of cooperative behavior in games under the learning method of sampling on networks.A strategy update rule based on sampling is introduced into the stag hunt game,where agents draw samples from their neighbors and then update their strategies based on conformity or inference according to the situation in the sample.Based on these assumptions,we present the state transition equations in the dynamic evolution of population cooperation,conduct simulation analysis on lattice networks and scale-free networks,and discuss how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation and how cooperation evolves under different levels of conformity in the network.Our simulation results show that blindly imitating the strategies of neighbors does not necessarily lead to rapid consensus in the population.Instead,rational inference through samples can better promote the evolution of the same strategy among all agents in the population.Moreover,the simulation results also show that a smaller sample size cannot reflect the true situation of the neighbors,which has a large randomness,and the size of the benefits obtained in cooperation determines the direction of the entire population towards cooperation or defection.This work incorporates the conforming behavior of agents into the game,uses the method of sampling for strategy updates and enriches the theory of evolutionary games with a more realistic significance.展开更多
This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,coo...This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.展开更多
In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers in...In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.展开更多
Energy cooperation is a key area in the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative.To deepen international energy cooperation,it is advisable to place greater emphasis on whole life cycle and systematic planni...Energy cooperation is a key area in the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative.To deepen international energy cooperation,it is advisable to place greater emphasis on whole life cycle and systematic planning in project collaboration,government-led initiatives with businesses playing a central role,alongside coordination with non-governmental international institutions,and comprehensive integration of resources.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.72031009)the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.20&ZD058)。
文摘We study the influence of conformity on the evolution of cooperative behavior in games under the learning method of sampling on networks.A strategy update rule based on sampling is introduced into the stag hunt game,where agents draw samples from their neighbors and then update their strategies based on conformity or inference according to the situation in the sample.Based on these assumptions,we present the state transition equations in the dynamic evolution of population cooperation,conduct simulation analysis on lattice networks and scale-free networks,and discuss how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation and how cooperation evolves under different levels of conformity in the network.Our simulation results show that blindly imitating the strategies of neighbors does not necessarily lead to rapid consensus in the population.Instead,rational inference through samples can better promote the evolution of the same strategy among all agents in the population.Moreover,the simulation results also show that a smaller sample size cannot reflect the true situation of the neighbors,which has a large randomness,and the size of the benefits obtained in cooperation determines the direction of the entire population towards cooperation or defection.This work incorporates the conforming behavior of agents into the game,uses the method of sampling for strategy updates and enriches the theory of evolutionary games with a more realistic significance.
基金Project supported by the Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.
基金the Open Foundation of Key Lab-oratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.
文摘Energy cooperation is a key area in the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative.To deepen international energy cooperation,it is advisable to place greater emphasis on whole life cycle and systematic planning in project collaboration,government-led initiatives with businesses playing a central role,alongside coordination with non-governmental international institutions,and comprehensive integration of resources.
