The article studies the evolutionary dynamics of two-population two-strategy game models with and without impulses. First, the payment matrix is given and two evolutionary dynamics models are established by adding sto...The article studies the evolutionary dynamics of two-population two-strategy game models with and without impulses. First, the payment matrix is given and two evolutionary dynamics models are established by adding stochastic and impulse. For the stochastic model without impulses, the existence and uniqueness of solution, and the existence of positive periodic solutions are proved, and a sufficient condition for strategy extinction is given. For the stochastic model with impulses, the existence of positive periodic solutions is proved. Numerical results show that noise and impulses directly affect the model, but the periodicity of the model does not change.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(10671182)。
文摘The article studies the evolutionary dynamics of two-population two-strategy game models with and without impulses. First, the payment matrix is given and two evolutionary dynamics models are established by adding stochastic and impulse. For the stochastic model without impulses, the existence and uniqueness of solution, and the existence of positive periodic solutions are proved, and a sufficient condition for strategy extinction is given. For the stochastic model with impulses, the existence of positive periodic solutions is proved. Numerical results show that noise and impulses directly affect the model, but the periodicity of the model does not change.
