Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satis...Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.展开更多
The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if so...The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if solvable)can be solved numerically by using the terminal value and the backward iteration.To investigate the solvability and solution of these equations the formation control problem as the differential game is replaced by a discrete-time dynamic game.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,the existence of Nash equilibrium controls for the discretetime formation control problem is shown.Second,a backward iteration approximate solution to the coupled Riccati differential equations in the continuous-time differential game is developed.An illustrative example is given to justify the models and solution.展开更多
The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy n...The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan＇s binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71671035)。
文摘Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.
文摘The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if solvable)can be solved numerically by using the terminal value and the backward iteration.To investigate the solvability and solution of these equations the formation control problem as the differential game is replaced by a discrete-time dynamic game.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,the existence of Nash equilibrium controls for the discretetime formation control problem is shown.Second,a backward iteration approximate solution to the coupled Riccati differential equations in the continuous-time differential game is developed.An illustrative example is given to justify the models and solution.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70771010)
文摘The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan＇s binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.
