提出了一种基于双层模型预测控制(model predictive control,MPC)的建筑与社区综合能源系统(integrated community energy system,ICES)主从博弈协调优化方法。首先,采用热阻-热容网络对建筑用户采暖负荷的热动态特性进行了建模。其次,...提出了一种基于双层模型预测控制(model predictive control,MPC)的建筑与社区综合能源系统(integrated community energy system,ICES)主从博弈协调优化方法。首先,采用热阻-热容网络对建筑用户采暖负荷的热动态特性进行了建模。其次,提出了基于双层MPC的建筑与ICES协调优化模型,在兼顾ICES运营商和建筑用户的差异化利益诉求的基础上,进一步考虑了在协调优化过程中面临的风电和光伏出力、ICES运营商向上级能源系统购买能源的价格、室外温度和光照强度等预测数据的不确定性。最后,通过算例验证了所提方法可合理平衡ICES和建筑用户的差异化利益诉求并有效应对协调优化中所面临的不确定性。展开更多
The objective of this paper is to study the various possible exchange rate strategies and its applications.For that,we use a game theoretical approach,first with a finite horizon,second with an infinite one.Two strate...The objective of this paper is to study the various possible exchange rate strategies and its applications.For that,we use a game theoretical approach,first with a finite horizon,second with an infinite one.Two strategies are possible (“weak” and “strong”).Depending on the time horizon,the equilibrium solution leads to two main implications.First,in the finite horizon case,an optimal Pareto solution can only be attained if both players mutually agree not on disrupt each other’s expectations on the exchange rate.Secondly,in the infinite horizon situation,it is the interest of each player to address a clear and strong signal to the other about its own strategy.These results have some important policy implications.展开更多
文摘提出了一种基于双层模型预测控制(model predictive control,MPC)的建筑与社区综合能源系统(integrated community energy system,ICES)主从博弈协调优化方法。首先,采用热阻-热容网络对建筑用户采暖负荷的热动态特性进行了建模。其次,提出了基于双层MPC的建筑与ICES协调优化模型,在兼顾ICES运营商和建筑用户的差异化利益诉求的基础上,进一步考虑了在协调优化过程中面临的风电和光伏出力、ICES运营商向上级能源系统购买能源的价格、室外温度和光照强度等预测数据的不确定性。最后,通过算例验证了所提方法可合理平衡ICES和建筑用户的差异化利益诉求并有效应对协调优化中所面临的不确定性。
文摘The objective of this paper is to study the various possible exchange rate strategies and its applications.For that,we use a game theoretical approach,first with a finite horizon,second with an infinite one.Two strategies are possible (“weak” and “strong”).Depending on the time horizon,the equilibrium solution leads to two main implications.First,in the finite horizon case,an optimal Pareto solution can only be attained if both players mutually agree not on disrupt each other’s expectations on the exchange rate.Secondly,in the infinite horizon situation,it is the interest of each player to address a clear and strong signal to the other about its own strategy.These results have some important policy implications.
