采用高频密码子分析法,对甜橙C itrus sinensis、温州蜜柑C.unshiu、葡萄柚C.paradisi和柠檬C.lim on等4种柑橘的蛋白质编码基因序列(codon DNA sequence,CDS)进行了分析,计算出了柑橘同义密码子相对使用频率(rela-tive frequency of sy...采用高频密码子分析法,对甜橙C itrus sinensis、温州蜜柑C.unshiu、葡萄柚C.paradisi和柠檬C.lim on等4种柑橘的蛋白质编码基因序列(codon DNA sequence,CDS)进行了分析,计算出了柑橘同义密码子相对使用频率(rela-tive frequency of synonymous codon,RFSC),确定出了4种柑橘的高频率密码子,发现不同种类柑橘偏爱密码子稍有差别.展开更多
生物体内密码子使用偏性对外源基因表达存在较大影响。本研究采用CodonW软件和高频密码子分析法,对白梨(Pyrus bretschneideri Rehd)、西洋梨(Pyrus communis Linn)、砂梨(Pyrus pyrifolia Nakai)、秋子梨(Pyrusussuriensis Maxim)4种...生物体内密码子使用偏性对外源基因表达存在较大影响。本研究采用CodonW软件和高频密码子分析法,对白梨(Pyrus bretschneideri Rehd)、西洋梨(Pyrus communis Linn)、砂梨(Pyrus pyrifolia Nakai)、秋子梨(Pyrusussuriensis Maxim)4种梨蛋白质编码基因序列(Codon DNA sequence,CDS)进行了同义密码子相对使用频率(relativefrequency of synonymous,RFSC)分析,确定了梨高频密码子共23个,结果同时显示梨不同种之间在密码子使用上具有较高的一致性。展开更多
【目的】分析13种植物actin基因的密码子组成、密码子偏性及聚类关系,了解其密码子使用模式及影响密码子使用的因素,为深入研究分子进化及物种进化提供参考。【方法】运用Codon W 1.4.4软件分析13种植物的肌动蛋白基因（actin）密码子...【目的】分析13种植物actin基因的密码子组成、密码子偏性及聚类关系,了解其密码子使用模式及影响密码子使用的因素,为深入研究分子进化及物种进化提供参考。【方法】运用Codon W 1.4.4软件分析13种植物的肌动蛋白基因（actin）密码子组成及使用参数,并对影响密码子偏性的因素进行研究。应用MEGA 4.1对13条基因的CDS序列进行聚类分析,采用SPSS 20.0进行密码子偏性的聚类分析。【结果】双子叶植物中actin基因的GC含量为45.0%～51.2%、GC3s含量为36.3%～53.8%,单子叶植物中GC含量为53.0%～58.3%、GC3s含量为60.9%～75.8%;actin基因在单子叶植物中偏爱G/C结尾的密码子,双子叶植物中偏爱A/T结尾的密码子。GC和GC3s与有效密码子数（ENC）呈极显著负相关（P〈0.01）,相关系数均为-0.906。ENC绘图分析结果表明,actin基因密码子偏性同时受突变和选择压力影响,单子叶植物受选择压力影响的程度大于双子叶植物。基于actin基因密码子偏性的聚类将单子叶植物高粱、玉米聚为一类,水稻、大麦、竹聚为一类,8种双子叶植物聚为一类。【结论】actin基因密码子偏性与碱基组成密切相关,其密码子偏性在单、双子叶植物间存在差异,依据密码子偏性的聚类能在一定程度上反映物种间的亲缘关系。展开更多
Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend P...Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend PC oracle based side-channel attacks to the second-order scenario and successfully conduct key-recovery attacks on the first-order masked Kyber.Firstly,we analyze the potential joint information leakage.Inspired by the binary PC oracle based attack proposed by Qin et al.at Asiacrypt 2021,we identify the 1-bit leakage scenario in the masked Keccak implementation.Moreover,we modify the ciphertexts construction described by Tanaka et al.at CHES 2023,extending the leakage scenario from 1-bit to 32-bit.With the assistance of TVLA,we validate these leakages through experiments.Secondly,for these two scenarios,we construct a binary PC oracle based on t-test and a multiple-valued PC oracle based on neural networks.Furthermore,we conduct practical side-channel attacks on masked Kyber by utilizing our oracles,with the implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.The demonstrated attacks require a minimum of 15788 and 648 traces to fully recover the key of Kyber768 in the 1-bit leakage scenario and the 32-bit leakage scenario,respectively.Our analysis may also be extended to attack other post-quantum schemes that use the same masked hash function.Finally,we apply the shuffling strategy to the first-order masked imple-mentation of the Kyber and perform leakage tests.Experimental results show that the combination strategy of shuffling and masking can effectively resist our proposed attacks.展开更多
A quantum group signature(QGS) scheme is proposed on the basis of an improved quantum chaotic encryption algorithm using the quantum one-time pad with a chaotic operation string. It involves a small-scale quantum comp...A quantum group signature(QGS) scheme is proposed on the basis of an improved quantum chaotic encryption algorithm using the quantum one-time pad with a chaotic operation string. It involves a small-scale quantum computation network in three phases, i.e. initializing phase, signing phase and verifying phase. In the scheme, a member of the group signs the message on behalf of the group while the receiver verifies the signature's validity with the aid of the trusty group manager who plays a crucial role when a possible dispute arises. Analysis result shows that the signature can neither be forged nor disavowed by any malicious attackers.展开更多
文摘采用高频密码子分析法,对甜橙C itrus sinensis、温州蜜柑C.unshiu、葡萄柚C.paradisi和柠檬C.lim on等4种柑橘的蛋白质编码基因序列(codon DNA sequence,CDS)进行了分析,计算出了柑橘同义密码子相对使用频率(rela-tive frequency of synonymous codon,RFSC),确定出了4种柑橘的高频率密码子,发现不同种类柑橘偏爱密码子稍有差别.
文摘生物体内密码子使用偏性对外源基因表达存在较大影响。本研究采用CodonW软件和高频密码子分析法,对白梨(Pyrus bretschneideri Rehd)、西洋梨(Pyrus communis Linn)、砂梨(Pyrus pyrifolia Nakai)、秋子梨(Pyrusussuriensis Maxim)4种梨蛋白质编码基因序列(Codon DNA sequence,CDS)进行了同义密码子相对使用频率(relativefrequency of synonymous,RFSC)分析,确定了梨高频密码子共23个,结果同时显示梨不同种之间在密码子使用上具有较高的一致性。
文摘【目的】分析13种植物actin基因的密码子组成、密码子偏性及聚类关系,了解其密码子使用模式及影响密码子使用的因素,为深入研究分子进化及物种进化提供参考。【方法】运用Codon W 1.4.4软件分析13种植物的肌动蛋白基因（actin）密码子组成及使用参数,并对影响密码子偏性的因素进行研究。应用MEGA 4.1对13条基因的CDS序列进行聚类分析,采用SPSS 20.0进行密码子偏性的聚类分析。【结果】双子叶植物中actin基因的GC含量为45.0%～51.2%、GC3s含量为36.3%～53.8%,单子叶植物中GC含量为53.0%～58.3%、GC3s含量为60.9%～75.8%;actin基因在单子叶植物中偏爱G/C结尾的密码子,双子叶植物中偏爱A/T结尾的密码子。GC和GC3s与有效密码子数（ENC）呈极显著负相关（P〈0.01）,相关系数均为-0.906。ENC绘图分析结果表明,actin基因密码子偏性同时受突变和选择压力影响,单子叶植物受选择压力影响的程度大于双子叶植物。基于actin基因密码子偏性的聚类将单子叶植物高粱、玉米聚为一类,水稻、大麦、竹聚为一类,8种双子叶植物聚为一类。【结论】actin基因密码子偏性与碱基组成密切相关,其密码子偏性在单、双子叶植物间存在差异,依据密码子偏性的聚类能在一定程度上反映物种间的亲缘关系。
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62472397)Innovation Program for Quantum Science and Technology(2021ZD0302902)。
文摘Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend PC oracle based side-channel attacks to the second-order scenario and successfully conduct key-recovery attacks on the first-order masked Kyber.Firstly,we analyze the potential joint information leakage.Inspired by the binary PC oracle based attack proposed by Qin et al.at Asiacrypt 2021,we identify the 1-bit leakage scenario in the masked Keccak implementation.Moreover,we modify the ciphertexts construction described by Tanaka et al.at CHES 2023,extending the leakage scenario from 1-bit to 32-bit.With the assistance of TVLA,we validate these leakages through experiments.Secondly,for these two scenarios,we construct a binary PC oracle based on t-test and a multiple-valued PC oracle based on neural networks.Furthermore,we conduct practical side-channel attacks on masked Kyber by utilizing our oracles,with the implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.The demonstrated attacks require a minimum of 15788 and 648 traces to fully recover the key of Kyber768 in the 1-bit leakage scenario and the 32-bit leakage scenario,respectively.Our analysis may also be extended to attack other post-quantum schemes that use the same masked hash function.Finally,we apply the shuffling strategy to the first-order masked imple-mentation of the Kyber and perform leakage tests.Experimental results show that the combination strategy of shuffling and masking can effectively resist our proposed attacks.
基金Project(61379057)supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaProject supported by the Construct Program of the Key Discipline in Hunan University of Arts and Science,China+1 种基金Project(2012BS01)supported by Science Technology Research and Development Projects of Changde,ChinaProject supported by Science and the MEST2012-002521,NRF,Korea
文摘A quantum group signature(QGS) scheme is proposed on the basis of an improved quantum chaotic encryption algorithm using the quantum one-time pad with a chaotic operation string. It involves a small-scale quantum computation network in three phases, i.e. initializing phase, signing phase and verifying phase. In the scheme, a member of the group signs the message on behalf of the group while the receiver verifies the signature's validity with the aid of the trusty group manager who plays a crucial role when a possible dispute arises. Analysis result shows that the signature can neither be forged nor disavowed by any malicious attackers.
