Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It ...Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It depicts a story of strong love and extreme hatred.This paper used the game theory to analyse the behaviors of Heathcliff in the Wuthering Heights.Some basic strategies and game models were used to illustrate the choices of the characters.This paper can be divided into four parts.The introduction is to introduce the novel,the description of the research approach and the definition of basic theories.It emphasizes on the introduction of basic strategies and some game models which would be used for the later analysis.The second part is to discuss the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality and analyses its causes.Heathcliff was very cruel in his revenge,but he also has a tender side in love,that is the manifestation of his dual personality.The formation of his dual personality dates back to his childhood suffering,the abnormal family environment,the pressure from long labor and finally his only love—Catherine's betrayal.The third part focuses on discussing how his dual personality affects Heathcliff's choices in the game plays with others.His tender personality affected Heathcliff's choice when facing Catherine's betrayal.He could not choose a grim strategy to totally break up with her,but choose a Tit for Tat and to combine with her after a revenge.His cruel personality made him harm other people indifferently which hide the foreshadowing for his death.The conclusion summarizes the arguments of this paper.This paper analyses from the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality,and then analyzes how his dual personality affected his choices in the game plays with others.展开更多
We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exp...We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.展开更多
We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the uncondit...We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each＇agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance VT as well as the initial composition of agents faO. Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including VT, faO, and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 〈 r 〈 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems.展开更多
文摘Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It depicts a story of strong love and extreme hatred.This paper used the game theory to analyse the behaviors of Heathcliff in the Wuthering Heights.Some basic strategies and game models were used to illustrate the choices of the characters.This paper can be divided into four parts.The introduction is to introduce the novel,the description of the research approach and the definition of basic theories.It emphasizes on the introduction of basic strategies and some game models which would be used for the later analysis.The second part is to discuss the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality and analyses its causes.Heathcliff was very cruel in his revenge,but he also has a tender side in love,that is the manifestation of his dual personality.The formation of his dual personality dates back to his childhood suffering,the abnormal family environment,the pressure from long labor and finally his only love—Catherine's betrayal.The third part focuses on discussing how his dual personality affects Heathcliff's choices in the game plays with others.His tender personality affected Heathcliff's choice when facing Catherine's betrayal.He could not choose a grim strategy to totally break up with her,but choose a Tit for Tat and to combine with her after a revenge.His cruel personality made him harm other people indifferently which hide the foreshadowing for his death.The conclusion summarizes the arguments of this paper.This paper analyses from the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality,and then analyzes how his dual personality affected his choices in the game plays with others.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grand No. 10575055)K. C. Wong Magna Fund in Ningbo University
文摘We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.11175131 and 10875086)
文摘We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each＇agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance VT as well as the initial composition of agents faO. Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including VT, faO, and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 〈 r 〈 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems.
